Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such settings, forming preferences is both difficult and critical. Prior work has suggested various prediction mechanisms that help agents make decisions about their preferences. Although often deployed together, these matching and prediction mechanisms are almost always analyzed separately. The present work shows that at the intersection of the two lies a previously unexplored type of strategic behavior: agents returning to the market (e.g., schools) can attack future predictions by interacting short-term non-optimally with their matches. Here, we first introduce this type of strategic behavior, which we call an adversarial interaction attack. Next, we construct a formal economic model that captures the feedback loop between prediction mechanisms designed to assist agents and the matching mechanism used to pair them. Finally, in a simplified setting, we prove that returning agents can benefit from using adversarial interaction attacks and gain progressively more as the trust in and accuracy of predictions increases. We also show that this attack increases inequality in the student population.

The Creator Economy faces concerning levels of unfairness. Content creators (CCs) publicly accuse platforms of purposefully reducing the visibility of their content based on protected attributes, while platforms place the blame on viewer biases. Meanwhile, prior work warns about the “rich-get-richer” effect perpetuated by existing popularity biases in recommender systems: Any initial advantage in visibility will likely be exacerbated over time. What remains unclear is how the biases based on protected attributes from platforms and viewers interact and contribute to the observed inequality in the context of popularity-biased recommender systems. The difficulty of the question lies in the complexity and opacity of the system. To overcome this challenge, we design a simple agent-based model (ABM) that unifies the platform systems which allocate the visibility of CCs (e.g., recommender systems, moderation) into a single popularity-based function, which we call the visibility allocation system (VAS). Through simulations, we find that although viewer homophilic biases do alone create inequalities, small levels of additional biases in VAS are more harmful. From the perspective of interventions, our results suggest that (a) attempts to reduce attribute-biases in moderation and recommendations should precede those reducing viewers’ homophilic tendencies, (b) decreasing the popularity-biases in VAS decreases but not eliminates inequalities, (c) boosting the visibility of protected CCs to overcome viewers’ homophily with respect to one fairness metric is unlikely to produce fair outcomes with respect to all metrics, and (d) the process is also unfair for viewers and this unfairness could be overcome through the same interventions. More generally, this work demonstrates the potential of using ABMs to better understand the causes and effects of biases and interventions within complex sociotechnical systems.