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Manfred Josef Aigner

dblp:29/3044 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2006
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 1 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Integrated circuit design · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 77% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 23%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Integrated circuit design › digital circuit design › cryptographic hardware
AES implementation
0.012003
A Highly Regular and Scalable AES Hardware Architecture · IEEE Trans. Computers 2003
Integrated circuit design › digital circuit design
cryptographic hardware
0.012003
A Highly Regular and Scalable AES Hardware Architecture · IEEE Trans. Computers 2003
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel countermeasures
power analysis countermeasure
0.012001
Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains as a Countermeasure against Power Attacks · CHES 2001
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel countermeasures
0.012001
Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains as a Countermeasure against Power Attacks · CHES 2001
Integrated circuit design
digital circuit design
0.012003
A Highly Regular and Scalable AES Hardware Architecture · IEEE Trans. Computers 2003
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
elliptic curve cryptography
0.012001
Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains as a Countermeasure against Power Attacks · CHES 2001
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography › elliptic curve cryptography
scalar multiplication
0.012001
Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains as a Countermeasure against Power Attacks · CHES 2001

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

CBC mode · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2006 Side channel analysis resistant design flow
abstract
The threat of side-channel attacks (SCA) is of crucial importance when designing systems with cryptographic hardware or software. The FP6-funded project SCARD enhances the typical micro-chip design flow in order to provide a means for designing side-channel resistant circuits and systems. Appropriate SCA-simulation tools and SCA analysis for the designer of secure systems are part of the project goals. We consider these enhancements for traditional design flows of micro-chips as necessary in order to enable the design for the next generation of secure and dependable devices. SCARD is in its final phase, the final result a SCARD chip designed by using the developed design flow is currently implemented
Manfred Josef Aigner, Stefan Mangard, Francesco Menichelli, Renato Menicocci, Mauro Olivieri, Thomas Popp, Giuseppe Scotti, Alessandro Trifiletti
ISCAS1
2003 A Highly Regular and Scalable AES Hardware Architecture
abstract
This article presents a highly regular and scalable AES hardware architecture, suited for full-custom as well as for semicustom design flows. Contrary to other publications, a complete architecture (even including CBC mode) that is scalable in terms of throughput and in terms of the used key size is described. Similarities of encryption and decryption are utilized to provide a high level of performance using only a relatively small area (10,799 gate equivalents for the standard configuration). This performance is reached by balancing the combinational paths of the design. No other published AES hardware architecture provides similar balancing or a comparable regularity. Implementations of the fastest configuration of the architecture provide a throughput of 241 Mbits/sec on a 0.6 /spl mu/m CMOS process using standard cells.
Stefan Mangard, Manfred Josef Aigner, Sandra Dominikus
IEEE Trans. Computers2
2001 Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains as a Countermeasure against Power Attacks
Elisabeth Oswald, Manfred Josef Aigner
CHES2