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Jie Huang 0010

dblp:29/6643-10 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 3 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Web and mobile security · 58% Systems and software security · 32% Privacy and data protection · 7%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Compilers and program optimization · 100%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security › mobile security
android security
1.032021
A11y and Privacy don't have to be mutually exclusive: Constraining Accessibility Service Misuse on Android · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
The ART of App Compartmentalization: Compiler-based Library Privilege Separation on Stock Android · CCS 2017
POSTER: The ART of App Compartmentalization · CCS 2016
Systems and software security
operating system security
0.422017
The ART of App Compartmentalization: Compiler-based Library Privilege Separation on Stock Android · CCS 2017
POSTER: The ART of App Compartmentalization · CCS 2016
Systems and software security › operating system security
privilege separation
0.312017
The ART of App Compartmentalization: Compiler-based Library Privilege Separation on Stock Android · CCS 2017
Web and mobile security
mobile security
0.212016
POSTER: The ART of App Compartmentalization · CCS 2016
Privacy and data protection
mobile privacy
0.112021
A11y and Privacy don't have to be mutually exclusive: Constraining Accessibility Service Misuse on Android · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Compilers and program optimization › program instrumentation
compiler instrumentation
0.112017
The ART of App Compartmentalization: Compiler-based Library Privilege Separation on Stock Android · CCS 2017
Authentication and access control
access control
0.112016
POSTER: The ART of App Compartmentalization · CCS 2016
Systems and software security › operating system security
sandboxing
0.112016
POSTER: The ART of App Compartmentalization · CCS 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

inter-process communication protocol design · 0.6compiler instrumentation · 0.6runtime compartmentalization · 0.2compiler-based instrumentation · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 A11y and Privacy don't have to be mutually exclusive: Constraining Accessibility Service Misuse on Android
Jie Huang 0010, Michael Backes 0001, Sven Bugiel
USENIX Security Symposium1
2019 Up-To-Crash: Evaluating Third-Party Library Updatability on Android
abstract
Buggy and flawed third-party libraries increase their host app's attack surface and put the users' privacy at risk. To avert this risk, libraries have to be kept updated to their newest versions by the app developers that integrate them into their projects. Recent researches revealed that the prevalence of outdated third-party libraries in Android apps is indeed a rampant problem, but also suggested that there is a great opportunity for drop-in replacements of outdated libraries, which would not even require cooperation by the app developers to update the libraries. However, all those conclusions are based on static app analysis, which can only provide an abstract view. In this work, we extend the updatability analysis to the runtime of apps. We implement a solution to update third-party libraries with drop-in replacements by their newer versions. To verify the feasibility of this developer-independent update mechanism, we dynamically test 3,000 real world apps for 3 popular libraries (78 library versions) for runtime failures stemming from incompatible library updates. To investigate the updatability of libraries in-depth, exploration enhanced dynamic testing is adopted to monitor the runtime behaviors of 15 apps before and after library updating. From our test, we find that the prior reported updatability rate is under real conditions overestimated by a factor of 1.57-2.06. Through root cause analysis, we find that the underlying problems prohibiting easy updates are intricate, such as deprecated functions, changed data structures, or entangled dependencies between different libraries and even the host app. We think our results not only put a more realistic light on the library updatability problem in Android, but also provide valuable insights for future solutions that provide automatic library updates or that try to support the app developers in better maintaining their external dependencies.
Jie Huang 0010, Nataniel P. Borges, Sven Bugiel, Michael Backes 0001
EuroS&P1
2017 The ART of App Compartmentalization: Compiler-based Library Privilege Separation on Stock Android
abstract
Third-party libraries are commonly used by app developers for alleviating the development efforts and for monetizing their apps. On Android, the host app and its third-party libraries reside in the same sandbox and share all privileges awarded to the host app by the user, putting the users' privacy at risk of intrusions by third-party libraries. In this paper, we introduce a new privilege separation approach for third-party libraries on stock Android. Our solution partitions Android applications at compile-time into isolated, privilege-separated compartments for the host app and the included third-party libraries. A particular benefit of our approach is that it leverages compiler-based instrumentation available on stock Android versions and thus abstains from modification of the SDK, the app bytecode, or the device firmware. A particular challenge for separating libraries from their host apps is the reconstruction of the communication channels and the preservation of visual fidelity between the now separated app and its libraries. We solve this challenge through new IPC-based protocols to synchronize layout and lifecycle management between different sandboxes. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our solution by applying it to real world apps from the Google Play Store that contain advertisements.
Jie Huang 0010, Oliver Schranz, Sven Bugiel, Michael Backes 0001
CCS1
2016 POSTER: The ART of App Compartmentalization
abstract
On Android, advertising libraries are commonly integrated with their host apps. Since the host and advertising components share the application's sandbox, advertisement code inherits all permissions and can access host resources with no further approval needed. Motivated by the privacy risks of advertisement libraries as already shown in the literature, this poster introduces an Android Runtime (ART) based app compartmentalization mechanism to achieve separation between trusted app code and untrusted library code without system modification and application rewriting. With our approach, advertising libraries will be isolated from the host app and the original app will be partitioned into two sub-apps that run independently, with the host app's resources and permissions being protected by Android's app sandboxing mechanism. ARTist [1], a compiler-based Android app instrumentation framework, is utilized here to recreate the communication channels between host and advertisement library. The result is a robust toolchain on device which provides a clean separation of developer-written app code and third-party advertisement code, allowing for finer-grained access control policies and information flow control without OS customization and application rebuilding.
Michael Backes 0001, Sven Bugiel, Jie Huang 0010, Oliver Schranz
CCS3