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Victor Duta

dblp:290/4154 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0003-1234-6968ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Systems and software security · 89% Hardware security and side channels · 11%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Operating systems · 84% Compilers and program optimization · 16%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › software vulnerability
double-fetch vulnerability
0.812024
SafeFetch: Practical Double-Fetch Protection with Kernel-Fetch Caching · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Systems and software security
operating system security
0.812024
SafeFetch: Practical Double-Fetch Protection with Kernel-Fetch Caching · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
kernel security
0.812024
SafeFetch: Practical Double-Fetch Protection with Kernel-Fetch Caching · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Systems and software security › memory safety
control-flow integrity
0.712023
Let Me Unwind That For You: Exceptions to Backward-Edge Protection · NDSS 2023
Systems and software security
exploitation
0.712023
Let Me Unwind That For You: Exceptions to Backward-Edge Protection · NDSS 2023
Systems and software security › exploitation › code reuse attack
return-oriented programming
0.712023
Let Me Unwind That For You: Exceptions to Backward-Edge Protection · NDSS 2023
Systems and software security › exploitation
control-flow hijacking
0.512021
PIBE: practical kernel control-flow hardening with profile-guided indirect branch elimination · ASPLOS 2021
Hardware security and side channels › microarchitectural attacks
transient execution attack
0.512021
PIBE: practical kernel control-flow hardening with profile-guided indirect branch elimination · ASPLOS 2021
Compilers and program optimization › dynamic optimization
profile-guided optimization
0.112021
PIBE: practical kernel control-flow hardening with profile-guided indirect branch elimination · ASPLOS 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

kernel-fetch caching · 1.5profile-guided optimization · 1.0indirect branch elimination · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 SafeFetch: Practical Double-Fetch Protection with Kernel-Fetch Caching
Victor Duta, Mitchel Aloserij, Cristiano Giuffrida
USENIX Security Symposium1
2023 Let Me Unwind That For You: Exceptions to Backward-Edge Protection
Victor Duta, Fabian Freyer, Fabio Pagani, Marius Muench, Cristiano Giuffrida
NDSS1
2021 PIBE: practical kernel control-flow hardening with profile-guided indirect branch elimination
abstract
Control-flow hijacking, which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code, remains a dangerous software vulnerability. Control-flow hijacking in speculated or transient execution is particularly insidious as it allows attackers to leak data from operating system kernels and other targets on commodity hardware, even in the absence of software bugs. Having made the jump from regular to transient execution in recent attacks, control-flow hijacking has become a top priority for developers. While powerful defenses against control-flow hijacking in regular execution are now sufficiently low-overhead to see wide-spread adoption, this is not the case for defenses in transient execution. Unfortunately, current techniques for mitigating attacks in transient execution exhibit high overheads—requiring a costly combination of defenses for every indirect branch.
Victor Duta, Cristiano Giuffrida, Herbert Bos, Erik van der Kouwe
ASPLOS1