EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Wai Man Si
dblp:294/0110
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
4as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 2 first-author · 4 since 2021Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
5 papers |
Efficient and distributed learning · 42% Trustworthy machine learning · 36% Language models and text generation · 22% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 14 heaviest of 15, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › AI safety
safety alignment |
1.9 | 2 | 2026 | Pruning Unsafe Tickets: A Resource-Efficient Framework for Safer and More Robust LLMs · ACL (1) 2026 SaLoRA: Safety-Alignment Preserved Low-Rank Adaptation · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › parameter-efficient fine-tuning
low-rank adaptation |
1.7 | 2 | 2025 | Finding and Reactivating Post-Trained LLMs' Hidden Safety Mechanisms · NeurIPS 2025 SaLoRA: Safety-Alignment Preserved Low-Rank Adaptation · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
parameter-efficient fine-tuning |
1.7 | 2 | 2025 | Finding and Reactivating Post-Trained LLMs' Hidden Safety Mechanisms · NeurIPS 2025 SaLoRA: Safety-Alignment Preserved Low-Rank Adaptation · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
1.2 | 2 | 2026 | Pruning Unsafe Tickets: A Resource-Efficient Framework for Safer and More Robust LLMs · ACL (1) 2026 Why So Toxic?: Measuring and Triggering Toxic Behavior in Open-Domain Chatbots · CCS 2022 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › generative model safety
jailbreak robustness |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pruning Unsafe Tickets: A Resource-Efficient Framework for Safer and More Robust LLMs · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
model compression |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pruning Unsafe Tickets: A Resource-Efficient Framework for Safer and More Robust LLMs · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › model compression
pruning |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pruning Unsafe Tickets: A Resource-Efficient Framework for Safer and More Robust LLMs · ACL (1) 2026 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Finding and Reactivating Post-Trained LLMs' Hidden Safety Mechanisms · NeurIPS 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model safety |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Finding and Reactivating Post-Trained LLMs' Hidden Safety Mechanisms · NeurIPS 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › large language model safety
safety fine-tuning |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | SaLoRA: Safety-Alignment Preserved Low-Rank Adaptation · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
model hijacking attack |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Two-in-One: A Model Hijacking Attack Against Text Generation Models · USENIX Security Symposium 2023 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › AI safety › content safety
toxicity analysis |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Why So Toxic?: Measuring and Triggering Toxic Behavior in Open-Domain Chatbots · CCS 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Why So Toxic?: Measuring and Triggering Toxic Behavior in Open-Domain Chatbots · CCS 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
fine-tuning attack |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Why So Toxic?: Measuring and Triggering Toxic Behavior in Open-Domain Chatbots · CCS 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
fine-tuning · 2.0LoRA · 1.7text generation models · 1.3GPT-2 · 1.1lottery ticket hypothesis · 1.0gradient-free attribution · 1.0safety module initialization · 0.9chain-of-thought · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Pruning Unsafe Tickets: A Resource-Efficient Framework for Safer and More Robust LLMsabstractMachine learning models are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, but even aligned models such as Mistral and LLaVA still exhibit unsafe behaviors inherited from pre-training.Current alignment methods like SFT and RLHF primarily encourage models to generate preferred responses, but do not explicitly remove the unsafe subnetworks that trigger harmful outputs.In this work, we introduce a resource-efficient pruning framework that directly identifies and removes parameters associated with unsafe behaviors while preserving model utility.Our method employs a gradient-free attribution mechanism, requiring only modest GPU resources, and generalizes across architectures and quantized variants.Empirical evaluations on ML models show substantial reductions in unsafe generations and improved robustness against jailbreak attacks, with minimal utility loss.From the perspective of the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis, our results suggest that ML models contain "unsafe tickets" responsible for harmful behaviors, and pruning reveals "safety tickets" that maintain performance while aligning outputs.This provides a lightweight, post-hoc alignment strategy suitable for deployment in resource-constrained settings. Wai Man Si, Mingjie Li 0007, Michael Backes 0001, Yang Zhang 0016 |
ACL (1) | 1 |
| 2025 | SaLoRA: Safety-Alignment Preserved Low-Rank AdaptationabstractAs advancements in large language models (LLMs) continue and the demand for personalized models increases, parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods (e.g., LoRA) become essential due to their efficiency in reducing computation costs.
However, recent studies have raised alarming concerns that LoRA fine-tuning could potentially compromise the safety alignment in LLMs, posing significant risks for the model owner.
In this paper, we first investigate the underlying mechanism by analyzing the changes in safety alignment related features before and after fine-tuning.
Then, we propose a fixed safety module calculated by safety data and a task-specific initialization for trainable parameters in low-rank adaptations, termed Safety-alignment preserved Low-Rank Adaptation (SaLoRA).
Unlike previous LoRA methods and their variants, SaLoRA enables targeted modifications to LLMs without disrupting their original alignments.
Our experiments show that SaLoRA outperforms various adapters-based approaches across various evaluation metrics in different fine-tuning tasks. Mingjie Li 0007, Wai Man Si, Michael Backes 0001, Yang Zhang 0016, Yisen Wang 0001 |
ICLR | 2 |
| 2025 | Finding and Reactivating Post-Trained LLMs' Hidden Safety MechanismsabstractDespite the impressive performance of general-purpose large language models (LLMs), they often require fine-tuning or post-training to excel at specific tasks.
For instance, large reasoning models (LRMs), such as the DeepSeek-R1 series, demonstrate strong reasoning capabilities after post-training different general large language models on diverse chain-of-thought (CoT) datasets.
However, this additional training frequently comes at the cost of reduced safety, as the fine-tuned or post-trained models tend to exhibit more harmful behaviors compared with the regular LLMs before post-training or fine-tuning, potentially leading to harmful outcomes due to their enhanced capabilities.
Taking LRMs as an example, we first investigate the underlying cause of this safety degradation in this paper.
Our analysis reveals that post-training can mask the original safety mechanisms of the base LLM, while over-amplifying representations related to their post-training ability.
But luckily, we also find that LRMs' safety mechanisms still exist instead of being removed during their post-training.
Based on these findings, we propose a lightweight and cost-effective solution called SafeReAct that restores the suppressed safety behaviors by aligning with LoRA adapters on a few layers. Experiments on four state-of-the-art LRMs show that our method significantly improves safety on harmful prompts without compromising reasoning performance. Besides LRMs, additional results on other domain-specific LLMs, like medical models, further confirm the generality and effectiveness of our approach. Mingjie Li 0007, Wai Man Si, Michael Backes 0001, Yang Zhang 0016, Yisen Wang 0001 |
NeurIPS | 2 |
| 2023 | Two-in-One: A Model Hijacking Attack Against Text Generation Models
Wai Man Si, Michael Backes 0001, Yang Zhang 0016, Ahmed Salem 0001 |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2022 | Why So Toxic?: Measuring and Triggering Toxic Behavior in Open-Domain ChatbotsabstractChatbots are used in many applications, e.g., automated agents, smart home assistants, interactive characters in online games, etc. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure they do not behave in undesired manners, providing offensive or toxic responses to users. This is not a trivial task as state-of-the-art chatbot models are trained on large, public datasets openly collected from the Internet. This paper presents a first-of-its-kind, large-scale measurement of toxicity in chatbots. We show that publicly available chatbots are prone to providing toxic responses when fed toxic queries. Even more worryingly, some non-toxic queries can trigger toxic responses too. We then set out to design and experiment with an attack, ToxicBuddy, which relies on fine-tuning GPT-2 to generate non-toxic queries that make chatbots respond in a toxic manner. Our extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that our attack is effective against public chatbot models and outperforms manually-crafted malicious queries proposed by previous work. We also evaluate three defense mechanisms against ToxicBuddy, showing that they either reduce the attack performance at the cost of affecting the chatbot's utility or are only effective at mitigating a portion of the attack. This highlights the need for more research from the computer security and online safety communities to ensure that chatbot models do not hurt their users. Overall, we are confident that ToxicBuddy can be used as an auditing tool and that our work will pave the way toward designing more effective defenses for chatbot safety. Wai Man Si, Michael Backes 0001, Jeremy Blackburn, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Gianluca Stringhini, Savvas Zannettou, Yang Zhang 0016 |
CCS | 1 |
| 2021 | Telling Stories through Multi-User Dialogue by Modeling Character RelationsabstractThis paper explores character-driven story continuation, in which the story emerges through characters' first-and second-person narration as well as dialogue-requiring models to select language that is consistent with a character's persona and their relationships with other characters while following and advancing the story.We hypothesize that a multi-task model that trains on character dialogue plus character relationship information improves transformer-based story continuation.To this end, we extend the Critical Role Dungeons and Dragons Dataset (Rameshkumar and Bailey, 2020)-consisting of dialogue transcripts of people collaboratively telling a story while playing the role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons-with automatically extracted relationships between each pair of interacting characters as well as their personas.A series of ablations lend evidence to our hypothesis, showing that our multi-task model using character relationships improves story continuation accuracy over strong baselines. Wai Man Si, Prithviraj Ammanabrolu, Mark O. Riedl |
SIGDIAL | 1 |