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Anna P. Y. Woo

dblp:294/1277 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 56% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 25% Privacy and data protection · 9%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
digital signatures
0.912025
Efficient Proofs of Possession for Legacy Signatures · SP 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › verifiable storage
proofs of possession
0.912025
Efficient Proofs of Possession for Legacy Signatures · SP 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs
0.912025
Efficient Proofs of Possession for Legacy Signatures · SP 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs › non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
zk-SNARK
0.912025
Efficient Proofs of Possession for Legacy Signatures · SP 2025
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving machine learning
0.512021
Goten: GPU-Outsourcing Trusted Execution of Neural Network Training · AAAI 2021
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure outsourcing
0.512021
Goten: GPU-Outsourcing Trusted Execution of Neural Network Training · AAAI 2021
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.512021
Goten: GPU-Outsourcing Trusted Execution of Neural Network Training · AAAI 2021
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography › elliptic curve cryptography
curve generation
0.312025
Efficient Proofs of Possession for Legacy Signatures · SP 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
elliptic curve
0.312025
Efficient Proofs of Possession for Legacy Signatures · SP 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

zk-SNARK · 0.9rank-one constraint system · 0.9randomized computation proof system · 0.9trusted execution environment · 0.5dynamic quantization · 0.5cryptographic protocols · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Efficient Proofs of Possession for Legacy Signatures
abstract
Digital signatures underpin identity, authenticity, and trust in modern computer systems. Cryptography research has shown that it is possible to prove possession of a valid message and signature for some public key, without revealing the message or signature. These proofs of possession work only for specially-designed signature schemes. Though these proofs of possession have many useful applications to improving security, privacy, and anonymity, they are not currently usable for widely deployed, legacy signature schemes—like RSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519. Unlocking practical proofs of possession for these legacy signature schemes requires closing a huge efficiency gap. This work brings proofs of possession for legacy signature schemes very close to practicality. Our design strategy is to encode the signature's verification algorithm as a rank-one constraint system (R1CS), then use a zkSNARK to prove knowledge of a solution. To do this efficiently we (1) design and analyze a new zkSNARK called Dorian that supports randomized computations, (2) introduce several new techniques for encoding hashes, elliptic curve operations, and modular arithmetic, (3) give a new approach that allows performing the most expensive parts of ECDSA and Ed25519 verifications outside R1CS, and (4) generate a novel elliptic curve that allows expressing Ed25519 curve operations very efficiently. Our techniques reduce R1CS sizes by up to 200× and prover times by more than 20×. We can generate a 240-byte proof of possession of an RSA signature over a message the size of a typical TLS certificate—two kilobytes—in only three seconds.
Anna P. Y. Woo, Alex Ozdemir, Chad Sharp, Thomas Pornin, Paul Grubbs
SP1
2021 Goten: GPU-Outsourcing Trusted Execution of Neural Network Training
abstract
Deep learning unlocks applications with societal impacts, e.g., detecting child exploitation imagery and genomic analysis of rare diseases. Deployment, however, needs compliance with stringent privacy regulations. Training algorithms that preserve the privacy of training data are in pressing need. Purely cryptographic approaches can protect privacy, but they are still costly, even when they rely on two or more non-colluding servers. Seemingly-"trivial" operations in plaintext quickly become prohibitively inefficient when a series of them are "crypto-processed," e.g., (dynamic) quantization for ensuring the intermediate values would not overflow. Slalom, recently proposed by Tramer and Boneh, is the first solution that leverages both GPU (for efficient batch computation) and a trusted execution environment (TEE) (for minimizing the use of cryptography). Roughly, it works by a lot of pre-computation over known and fixed weights, and hence it only supports private inference. Five related problems for private training are left unaddressed. Goten, our privacy-preserving training and prediction framework, tackles all five problems simultaneously via our careful design over the "mismatched" cryptographic and GPU data types (due to the tension between precision and efficiency) and our round-optimal GPU-outsourcing protocol (hence minimizing the communication cost between servers). It 1) stochastically trains a low-bitwidth yet accurate model, 2) supports dynamic quantization (a challenge left by Slalom), 3) minimizes the memory-swapping overhead of the memory-limited TEE and its communication with GPU, 4) crypto-protects the (dynamic) model weight from untrusted GPU, and 5) outperforms a pure-TEE system, even without pre-computation (needed by Slalom). As a baseline, we build CaffeScone that secures Caffe using TEE but not GPU; Goten shows a 6.84x speed-up of the whole VGG-11. Goten also outperforms Falcon proposed by Wagh et al., the latest secure multi-server cryptographic solution, by 132.64x using VGG-11. Lastly, we demonstrate Goten's efficacy in training models for breast cancer diagnosis over sensitive images.
Lucien K. L. Ng, Sherman S. M. Chow, Anna P. Y. Woo, Donald P. H. Wong, Yongjun Zhao 0001
AAAI3
2021 LDSP: Shopping with Cryptocurrency Privately and Quickly under Leadership
abstract
LDSP is a layer-2 cryptocurrency payment system that supports a dynamic and distributed setup with scalability and payer privacy. Different from the statekeeping merchant consortium assumed by a recent layer-2 solution Snappy (NDSS 2020), its core idea is to rely on leaders selected from the merchants to lead a mini-consortium and ensure the fungibility of the LDSP coins. Similar to Snappy, payers can transfer coins off-chain, enjoying low-latency transactions, while the merchants are assured that they will receive the coins. Privacy-wise, Snappy requires all merchants to check the whole customer transaction history, which is not necessary for LDSP.
Lucien K. L. Ng, Sherman S. M. Chow, Donald P. H. Wong, Anna P. Y. Woo
ICDCS4