Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Igor Shilov
dblp:294/4699
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
0as first author
5since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 4 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
5 papers |
Privacy and data protection · 70% Security and privacy of machine learning · 21% Digital forensics and information hiding · 10% | |
| Artificial intelligence
3 papers |
Language models and text generation · 65% Trustworthy machine learning · 35% |
Topics — the 12 heaviest of 14, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference |
1.6 | 2 | 2025 | Exploring the limits of strong membership inference attacks on large language models · NeurIPS 2025 Copyright Traps for Large Language Models · ICML 2024 |
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy |
1.4 | 2 | 2025 | Certification for Differentially Private Prediction in Gradient-Based Training · ICML 2025 Antipodes of Label Differential Privacy: PATE and ALIBI · NeurIPS 2021 |
Privacy and data protection
privacy risk assessment |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Free Record-Level Privacy Risk Evaluation Through Artifact-Based Methods · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
private prediction |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Certification for Differentially Private Prediction in Gradient-Based Training · ICML 2025 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › privacy mechanism design
sensitivity analysis |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Certification for Differentially Private Prediction in Gradient-Based Training · ICML 2025 |
Digital forensics and information hiding
copyright protection |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Copyright Traps for Large Language Models · ICML 2024 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › relaxed differential privacy
label differential privacy |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Antipodes of Label Differential Privacy: PATE and ALIBI · NeurIPS 2021 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › differentially private deep learning
PATE |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Antipodes of Label Differential Privacy: PATE and ALIBI · NeurIPS 2021 |
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving machine learning |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Antipodes of Label Differential Privacy: PATE and ALIBI · NeurIPS 2021 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
pre-trained language model |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Exploring the limits of strong membership inference attacks on large language models · NeurIPS 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › privacy
privacy-preserving machine learning |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Certification for Differentially Private Prediction in Gradient-Based Training · ICML 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › large language model › knowledge in language models
memorization |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Copyright Traps for Large Language Models · ICML 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
smooth sensitivity · 1.7convex relaxation · 1.7bound propagation · 1.7LiRA · 1.7randomized controlled experiment · 1.5canary insertion · 1.5semi-supervised learning · 0.5randomized response · 0.5laplace mechanism · 0.5bayesian inference · 0.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Certification for Differentially Private Prediction in Gradient-Based TrainingabstractWe study private prediction where differential privacy is achieved by adding noise to the outputs of a non-private model. Existing methods rely on noise proportional to the global sensitivity of the model, often resulting in sub-optimal privacy-utility trade-offs compared to private training. We introduce a novel approach for computing dataset-specific upper bounds on prediction sensitivity by leveraging convex relaxation and bound propagation techniques. By combining these bounds with the smooth sensitivity mechanism, we significantly improve the privacy analysis of private prediction compared to global sensitivity-based approaches. Experimental results across real-world datasets in medical image classification and natural language processing demonstrate that our sensitivity bounds are can be orders of magnitude tighter than global sensitivity. Our approach provides a strong basis for the development of novel privacy preserving technologies. Matthew Wicker, Philip Sosnin, Igor Shilov, Adrianna Janik, Mark Niklas Müller, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Adrian Weller, Calvin Tsay |
ICML | 3 |
| 2025 | Exploring the limits of strong membership inference attacks on large language modelsabstractState-of-the-art membership inference attacks (MIAs) typically require training many reference models, making it difficult to scale these attacks to large pre-trained language models (LLMs). As a result, prior research has either relied on weaker attacks that avoid training references (e.g., fine-tuning attacks), or on stronger attacks applied to small models and datasets. However, weaker attacks have been shown to be brittle and insights from strong attacks in simplified settings do not translate to today's LLMs. These challenges prompt an important question: are the limitations observed in prior work due to attack design choices, or are MIAs fundamentally ineffective on LLMs? We address this question by scaling LiRA--one of the strongest MIAs--to GPT-2 architectures ranging from 10M to 1B parameters, training references on over 20B tokens from the C4 dataset. Our results advance the understanding of MIAs on LLMs in four key ways. While (1) strong MIAs can succeed on pre-trained LLMs, (2) their effectiveness, remains limited (e.g., AUC<0.7) in practical settings. (3) Even when strong MIAs achieve better-than-random AUC, aggregate metrics can conceal substantial per-sample MIA decision instability: due to training randomness, many decisions are so unstable that they are statistically indistinguishable from a coin flip. Finally, (4) the relationship between MIA success and related LLM privacy metrics is not as straightforward as prior work has suggested. Jamie Hayes, Ilia Shumailov, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Matthew Jagielski, Georgios Kaissis, Milad Nasr, Meenatchi Sundaram Muthu Selva Annamalai, Niloofar Mireshghallah, Igor Shilov, Matthieu Meeus, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Katherine Lee, Franziska Boenisch, Adam Dziedzic, A. Feder Cooper |
NeurIPS | 9 |
| 2025 | Free Record-Level Privacy Risk Evaluation Through Artifact-Based Methods
Joseph Pollock, Igor Shilov, Euodia Dodd, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2024 | Copyright Traps for Large Language ModelsabstractQuestions of fair use of copyright-protected content to train Large Language Models (LLMs) are being actively debated. Document-level inference has been proposed as a new task: inferring from black-box access to the trained model whether a piece of content has been seen during training. SOTA methods however rely on naturally occurring memorization of (part of) the content. While very effective against models that memorize significantly, we hypothesize - and later confirm - that they will not work against models that do not naturally memorize, e.g. medium-size 1B models. We here propose to use copyright traps, the inclusion of fictitious entries in original content, to detect the use of copyrighted materials in LLMs with a focus on models where memorization does not naturally occur. We carefully design a randomized controlled experimental setup, inserting traps into original content (books) and train a 1.3B LLM from scratch. We first validate that the use of content in our target model would be undetectable using existing methods. We then show, contrary to intuition, that even medium-length trap sentences repeated a significant number of times (100) are not detectable using existing methods. However, we show that longer sequences repeated a large number of times can be reliably detected (AUC=0.75) and used as copyright traps. Beyond copyright applications, our findings contribute to the study of LLM memorization: the randomized controlled setup enables us to draw causal relationships between memorization and certain sequence properties such as repetition in model training data and perplexity. Matthieu Meeus, Igor Shilov, Manuel Faysse, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye |
ICML | 2 |
| 2021 | Antipodes of Label Differential Privacy: PATE and ALIBIabstractWe consider the privacy-preserving machine learning (ML) setting where the trained model must satisfy differential privacy (DP) with respect to the labels of the training examples. We propose two novel approaches based on, respectively, the Laplace mechanism and the PATE framework, and demonstrate their effectiveness on standard benchmarks.While recent work by Ghazi et al. proposed Label DP schemes based on a randomized response mechanism, we argue that additive Laplace noise coupled with Bayesian inference (ALIBI) is a better fit for typical ML tasks. Moreover, we show how to achieve very strong privacy levels in some regimes, with our adaptation of the PATE framework that builds on recent advances in semi-supervised learning.We complement theoretical analysis of our algorithms' privacy guarantees with empirical evaluation of their memorization properties. Our evaluation suggests that comparing different algorithms according to their provable DP guarantees can be misleading and favor a less private algorithm with a tighter analysis.Code for implementation of algorithms and memorization attacks is available from https://github.com/facebookresearch/labeldpantipodes. Mani Malek 0001, Ilya Mironov, Karthik Prasad, Igor Shilov, Florian Tramèr |
NeurIPS | 4 |