Diffusion source identification on networks is a problem of fundamental importance in a broad class of applications, including controlling the spreading of rumors on social media, identifying a computer virus over cyber networks, or identifying the disease center during epidemiology. Though this problem has received significant recent attention, most known approaches are well-studied in only very restrictive settings and lack theoretical guarantees for more realistic networks. We introduce a statistical framework for the study of this problem and develop a confidence set inference approach inspired by hypothesis testing. Our method efficiently produces a small subset of nodes, which provably covers the source node with any pre-specified confidence level without restrictive assumptions on network structures. To our knowledge, this is the first diffusion source identification method with a practically useful theoretical guarantee on general networks. We demonstrate our approach via extensive synthetic experiments on well-known random network models, a large data set of real-world networks as well as a mobility network between cities concerning the COVID-19 spreading in January 2020.

A ubiquitous learning problem in today’s digital market is, during repeated interactions between a seller and a buyer, how a seller can gradually learn optimal pricing decisions based on the buyer’s past purchase responses. A fundamental challenge of learning in such a strategic setup is that the buyer will naturally have incentives to manipulate his responses in order to induce more favorable learning outcomes for him. To understand the limits of the seller’s learning when facing such a strategic and possibly manipulative buyer, we study a natural yet powerful buyer manipulation strategy. That is, before the pricing game starts, the buyer simply commits to “imitate” a different value function by pretending to always react optimally according to this imitative value function. We fully characterize the optimal imitative value function that the buyer should imitate as well as the resultant seller revenue and buyer surplus under this optimal buyer manipulation. Our characterizations reveal many useful insights about what happens at equilibrium. For example, a seller with concave production cost will obtain essentially 0 revenue at equilibrium whereas the revenue for a seller with convex production cost is the Bregman divergence of her cost function between no production and certain production. Finally, and importantly, we show that a more powerful class of pricing schemes does not necessarily increase, in fact, may be harmful to, the seller’s revenue. Our results not only lead to an effective prescriptive way for buyers to manipulate learning algorithms but also shed lights on the limits of what a seller can really achieve when pricing in the dark.