Resource competition and intentional disruptions, grounded in rational intergroup conflict theory, play a central role in driving strategic rivalry in networked games. These mechanisms mirror real-world conflict dynamics, profoundly shaping decision-making processes and interfering with systemic stability. This study investigates the modeling and dynamics of networked evolutionary games with intergroup conflict (NEGs-IC). In the proposed framework, players are assigned a finite number of health points, which decrease when attacked–affecting both survivability and strategic interactions. Leveraging logical dynamical system modeling, we capture the co-evolution of strategies, payoffs, health points, and player actions, demonstrating that NEGs-IC can be effectively represented as a logical dynamic system. To characterize collective interest in NEGs-IC, we introduce an objective function that balances group cooperation and health point attrition. Based on this formulation, we define three evaluation criteria–optimal, suboptimal, and weak–to assess collective interest. An illustrative example is also presented to analyze network-based conflicts, offering insights into strategic behavior in adversarial environments.

Network games primarily explore the intricacies of individual interactions and adaptive strategies within a network. Building upon this framework, the present study delves into the modeling, analysis, and control of heterogeneously networked evolutionary games with intergroup conflict (HNEG-IC), where attacking players possess area-monitoring capabilities with limited attacking power. To begin with, a mathematical model is introduced to capture intragroup strategy dynamics and intergroup conflicts of HNEGs-IC via the algebraic state space representation (ASSR). A necessary and sufficient condition for achieving global cooperation of HNEGs-IC is established. Then, a criterion for verifying the κ -cooperation below a certain mortality is presented. Considering the HNEGs-IC with strategy feedback control, it is proven that the feedback control, subject to global cooperation, is robust to conflicts when the intersection of the strategy threshold set and the reachable set of the preset initial strategy profiles is empty. Finally, for verification and demonstration, the obtained results are applied to a simplified virtual game model of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact.