Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Nakshatra Gupta

dblp:296/4166 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Computational complexity · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
1.012026
On Robustness of Linear Classifiers to Targeted Data Poisoning · AAAI 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack
1.012026
On Robustness of Linear Classifiers to Targeted Data Poisoning · AAAI 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
targeted poisoning attack
1.012026
On Robustness of Linear Classifiers to Targeted Data Poisoning · AAAI 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

linear classifier · 3.0NP-completeness proof · 3.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 On Robustness of Linear Classifiers to Targeted Data Poisoning
abstract
Data poisoning is a training-time attack that undermines the trustworthiness of learned models. In a targeted data poisoning attack, an adversary manipulates the training dataset to alter the classification of a targeted test point. Given the typically large size of training dataset, manual detection of poisoning is difficult. An alternative is to automatically measure a dataset's robustness against such an attack, which is the focus of this paper. We consider a threat model wherein an adversary can only perturb the labels of the training dataset, with knowledge limited to the hypothesis space of the victim's model. In this setting, we prove that finding the robustness is an NP-Complete problem, even when hypotheses are linear classifiers. To overcome this, we present a technique that finds lower and upper bounds of robustness. Our implementation of the technique computes these bounds efficiently in practice for many publicly available datasets. We experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Specifically, a poisoning exceeding the identified robustness bounds significantly impacts test point classification. We are also able to compute these bounds in many more cases where state-of-the-art techniques fail.
Nakshatra Gupta, Sumanth Prabhu S, Supratik Chakraborty, R. Venkatesh 0001
AAAI1