Protecting against multi-step attacks of uncertain start times and duration forces the defenders into indefinite, always ongoing, resource-intensive response. To allocate resources effectively, the defender must analyze and respond to an uncertain stream of potentially undetected multiple multi-step attacks and take measures of attack and response intensity over time into account. Such response requires estimation of overall attack success metrics and evaluating effect of defender strategies and actions associated with specific attack steps on overall attack metrics. We present a novel game-theoretic approach GPLADD to attack metrics estimation and demonstrate it on attack data derived from MITRE’s ATT&CK Framework and other sources. In GPLADD, the time to complete attack steps is explicit; the attack dynamics emerges from attack graph and attacker-defender capabilities and strategies and therefore reflects “physics” of attacks. The time the attacker takes to complete an attack step is drawn from a probability distribution determined by attacker and defender strategies and capabilities. This makes time a physical constraint on attack success parameters and enables comparing different defender resource allocation strategies across different attacks. We solve for attack success metrics by approximating attacker-defender games as discrete-time Markov chains and show evaluation of return on detection investments associated with different attack steps. We apply GPLADD to MITRE’s APT3 data from ATT&CK Framework and show that there are substantial and un-intuitive differences in estimated real-world vendor performance against a simplified APT3 attack. We focus on metrics that reflect attack difficulty versus attacker ability to remain hidden in the system after gaining control. This enables practical defender optimization and resource allocation against multi-step attacks.