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Dvir Gilor

dblp:297/4652 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-0121-126XORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 first-author · 3 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
ascending auction
0.712023
Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets · Artif. Intell. 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
budget-constrained auction
0.512021
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets · Artif. Intell. 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.322023
Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets · Artif. Intell. 2023
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets · Artif. Intell. 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Artif. Intell.1
2021 Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-sided Markets
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
EUMAS1
2021 Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Artif. Intell.1