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Kyeongseok Yang

dblp:297/9640 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 82% Systems and software security · 18%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Embedded and real-time systems · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
automated attack discovery
0.612022
Poster: Automated Discovery of Sensor Spoofing Attacks on Robotic Vehicles · CCS 2022
Cyber-physical and IoT security › robot security
robotic vehicle security
0.612022
Poster: Automated Discovery of Sensor Spoofing Attacks on Robotic Vehicles · CCS 2022
Cyber-physical and IoT security › sensor security
sensor spoofing
0.612022
Poster: Automated Discovery of Sensor Spoofing Attacks on Robotic Vehicles · CCS 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

simulation · 1.7feedback-driven fuzzing · 1.7high-fidelity simulation · 0.6fuzzing · 0.6formal modeling · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 IMUFuzzer: Resilience-based Discovery of Signal Injection Attacks on Robotic Aerial Vehicles
abstract
Robotic aerial vehicles (RAVs), particularly drones, are crucial in civil and military sectors. However, researchers have found that adversaries can inject noise into sensor measurements and cause physical impacts on the RAVs like crashes. Although identifying such signal injection attacks is essential to evaluate and improve the robustness of an RAV, it is challenging to discover them since their impact depends on the RAV’s physical states and the search space of noise signals and physical states is vast due to its dynamic nature.This paper proposes IMUFUZZER, a feedback-driven fuzzing framework, to automatically test an RAVs system and discover signal injection attacks. IMUFUZZER generates realistic noise signals for various inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensors, and monitors their impact on RAV control to detect mission failures, leveraging a high-fidelity RAV simulator. To find the physical states that attacks depend on, IMUFUZZER generates various mission paths that the RAV will fly through. We develop a novel feedback mechanism to quantify the resilience of the RAV against attacks and efficiently guide the fuzzing process to find signal injection attacks. Using IMUFUZZER, we have discovered 23 successful signal injection attacks on popular RAV control software (ArduPilot). We evaluate the correctness and effectiveness of our feedback-based sensor fuzzing and demonstrate the feasibility of the discovered attacks through physical experiments.
Sudharssan Mohan, Kyeongseok Yang, Zelun Kong, Yonghwi Kwon 0001, Junghwan Rhee, Tyler Summers, Hongjun Choi, Heejo Lee
ASE2
2022 Poster: Automated Discovery of Sensor Spoofing Attacks on Robotic Vehicles
abstract
Robotic vehicles are playing an increasingly important role in our daily life. Unfortunately, attackers have demonstrated various sensor spoofing attacks that interfere with robotic vehicle operations, imposing serious threats. Thus, it is crucial to discover such attacks earlier than attackers so that developers can secure the vehicles. In this paper, we propose a new sensor fuzzing framework SensorFuzz that can systematically discover potential sensor spoofing attacks on robotic vehicles. It generates malicious sensor inputs by formally modeling the existing sensor attacks and leveraging high-fidelity vehicle simulation, and then analyzes the impact of the inputs on the vehicle with a resilience-based feedback mechanism.
Kyeongseok Yang, Sudharssan Mohan, Yonghwi Kwon 0001, Heejo Lee
CCS1
2021 QuickBCC: Quick and Scalable Binary Vulnerable Code Clone Detection
Hajin Jang, Kyeongseok Yang, Geonwoo Lee, Yoonjong Na, Jeremy D. Seideman, Shoufu Luo, Heejo Lee, Sven Dietrich
SEC2