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Meiyu Lin

dblp:299/2588 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 50% Systems and software security · 50%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.912025
Are Your LLM-based Text-to-SQL Models Secure? Exploring SQL Injection via Backdoor Attacks · Proc. ACM Manag. Data 2025
Systems and software security › exploitation › injection attacks
SQL injection
0.912025
Are Your LLM-based Text-to-SQL Models Secure? Exploring SQL Injection via Backdoor Attacks · Proc. ACM Manag. Data 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

poisoned fine-tuning · 0.9character-level triggers · 0.9backdoor attack · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Data poisoning-based backdoor attacks against supervised learning rules of Spiking Neural Networks
Lingxin Jin, Wei Jiang 0016, Jinyu Zhan, Meiyu Lin, Letian Chen, Boran Quan, Lin Zuo, Xingzhi Zhou 0001, Maregu Assefa, Naoufel Werghi
J. Syst. Archit.4
2025 Are Your LLM-based Text-to-SQL Models Secure? Exploring SQL Injection via Backdoor Attacks
abstract
Large language models (LLMs) have shown state-of-the-art results in translating natural language questions into SQL queries (Text-to-SQL), a long-standing challenge within the database community. However, security concerns remain largely unexplored, particularly the threat of backdoor attacks, which can introduce malicious behaviors into models through fine-tuning with poisoned datasets. In this work, we systematically investigate the vulnerabilities of LLM-based Text-to-SQL models and present ToxicSQL, a novel backdoor attack framework. Our approach leverages stealthy command-like and character-level triggers to make backdoors difficult to detect and remove, ensuring that malicious behaviors remain covert while maintaining high model accuracy on benign inputs. Furthermore, we propose leveraging SQL injection payloads as backdoor targets, enabling the generation of malicious yet executable SQL queries, which pose severe security and privacy risks in language model-based SQL development. We demonstrate that injecting only 0.44% of poisoned data can result in an attack success rate of 79.41%, posing a significant risk to database security. Additionally, we propose detection and mitigation strategies to enhance model reliability. Our findings highlight the urgent need for security-aware Text-to-SQL development, emphasizing the importance of robust defenses against backdoor threats.
Meiyu Lin, Jiale Lao, Renyuan Li, Yuanchun Zhou, Carl Yang 0001, Yang Cao 0011, MingJie Tang
Proc. ACM Manag. Data1