Algorithmic predictions are increasingly informing societal resource allocations by identifying individuals for targeting. Policymakers often build these systems with the assumption that by gathering more observations on individuals, they can improve predictive accuracy and, consequently, allocation efficiency. An overlooked yet consequential aspect of prediction-driven allocations is that of timing. The planner has to trade off relying on earlier and potentially noisier predictions to intervene before individuals experience undesirable outcomes, or they may wait to gather more observations to make more precise allocations. We examine this tension using a simple mathematical model, where the planner collects observations on individuals to improve predictions over time. We analyze both the ranking induced by these predictions and optimal resource allocation. We show that though individual prediction accuracy improves over time, counter-intuitively, the average ranking loss can worsen. As a result, the planner's ability to improve social welfare can decline. We identify inequality as a driving factor behind this phenomenon. Our findings provide a nuanced perspective and challenge the conventional wisdom that it is preferable to wait for more accurate predictions to ensure the most efficient allocations.

Counterfactual explanations provide individuals with cost-optimal recommendations to achieve their desired outcomes. However, when a significant number of individuals seek similar state modifications, this individual-centric approach can inadvertently create competition and introduce unforeseen costs. Additionally, disregarding the underlying data distribution may lead to recommendations that individuals perceive as unusual or impractical. To address these challenges, we propose a novel framework that extends standard counterfactual explanations by incorporating a population dynamics model. This framework penalizes deviations from equilibrium after individuals follow the recommendations, effectively mitigating externalities caused by correlated changes across the population. By balancing individual modification costs with their impact on others, our method ensures a more equitable and efficient outcome. We show how this approach reframes the counterfactual explanation problem from an individual-centric task to a collective optimization problem. Augmenting our theoretical insights, we design and implement scalable algorithms for computing collective counterfactuals, showcasing their effectiveness and advantages over existing recourse methods, particularly in aligning with collective objectives.

From media platforms to chatbots, algorithms shape how people interact, learn, and discover information. Such interactions between users and an algorithm often unfold over multiple steps, during which strategic users can guide the algorithm to better align with their true interests by selectively engaging with content. However, users frequently exhibit inconsistent preferences: they may spend considerable time on content that offers little long-term value, inadvertently signaling that such content is desirable. Focusing on the user side, this raises a key question: what does it take for such users to align the algorithm with their true interests? To investigate these dynamics, we model the user’s decision process as split between a rational "system 2" that decides whether to engage and an impulsive "system 1" that determines how long engagement lasts. We then study a multi-leader, single-follower extensive Stackelberg game, where users, specifically system 2, lead by committing to engagement strategies and the algorithm best-responds based on observed interactions. We define the burden of alignment as the minimum horizon over which users must optimize to effectively steer the algorithm. We show that a critical horizon exists: users who are sufficiently foresighted can achieve alignment, while those who are not are instead aligned to the algorithm’s objective. This critical horizon can be long, imposing a substantial burden. However, even a small, costly signal (e.g., an extra click) can significantly reduce it. Overall, our framework explains how users with inconsistent preferences can align an engagement-driven algorithm with their interests in a Stackelberg equilibrium, highlighting both the challenges and potential remedies for achieving alignment.

Alignment with human preferences is commonly framed using a universal reward function, even though human preferences are inherently heterogeneous. We formalize this heterogeneity by introducing user types and examine the limits of the homogeneity assumption. We show that aligning to heterogeneous preferences with a single policy is best achieved using the average reward across user types. However, this requires additional information about annotators. We examine improvements under different information settings, focusing on direct alignment methods. We find that minimal information can yield first-order improvements, while full feedback from each user type leads to consistent learning of the optimal policy. Surprisingly, however, no sample-efficient consistent direct loss exists in this latter setting. These results reveal a fundamental tension between consistency and sample efficiency in direct policy alignment.

Algorithmic predictions are emerging as a promising solution concept for efficiently allocating societal resources. Fueling their use is an underlying assumption that such systems are necessary to identify individuals for interventions. We propose a principled framework for assessing this assumption: Using a simple mathematical model, we evaluate the efficacy of prediction-based allocations in settings where individuals belong to larger units such as hospitals, neighborhoods, or schools. We find that prediction-based allocations outperform baseline methods using aggregate unit-level statistics only when between-unit inequality is low and the intervention budget is high. Our results hold for a wide range of settings for the price of prediction, treatment effect heterogeneity, and unit-level statistics’ learnability. Combined, we highlight the potential limits to improving the efficacy of interventions through prediction.

Medical treatments often involve a sequence of decisions, each informed by previous outcomes. This process closely aligns with reinforcement learning (RL), a framework for optimizing sequential decisions to maximize cumulative rewards under unknown dynamics. While RL shows promise for creating data-driven treatment plans, its application in medical contexts is challenging due to the frequent need to use sparse rewards, primarily defined based on mortality outcomes. This sparsity can reduce the stability of offline estimates, posing a significant hurdle in fully utilizing RL for medical decision-making. We introduce a deep Q-learning approach to obtain more reliable critical care policies by integrating relevant but noisy frequently measured biomarker signals into the reward specification without compromising the optimization of the main outcome. Our method prunes the action space based on all available rewards before training a final model on the sparse main reward. This approach minimizes potential distortions of the main objective while extracting valuable information from intermediate signals to guide learning. We evaluate our method in off-policy and offline settings using simulated environments and real health records from intensive care units. Our empirical results demonstrate that our method outperforms common offline RL methods such as conservative Q-learning and batch-constrained deep Q-learning. By disentangling sparse rewards and frequently measured reward proxies through action pruning, our work represents a step towards developing reliable policies that effectively harness the wealth of available information in data-intensive critical care environments.

The tendency for individuals to form social ties with others who are similar to themselves, known as homophily, is one of the most robust sociological principles. Since this phenomenon can lead to patterns of interactions that segregate people along different demographic dimensions, it can also lead to inequalities in access to information, resources, and opportunities. As we consider potential interventions that might alleviate the effects of segregation, we face the challenge that homophily constitutes a pervasive and organic force that is difficult to push back against. Designing effective interventions can therefore benefit from identifying counterbalancing social processes that might be harnessed to work in opposition to segregation.