Most of the world’s power grids are controlled remotely. Their control messages are sent over potentially insecure channels, driving the need for an authentication mechanism. The main communication mechanism for power grids and other utilities is defined by an IEEE standard, referred to as DNP3; this includes the Secure Authentication v5 (SAv5) protocol, which aims to ensure that messages are authenticated. We provide the first security analysis of the complete DNP3: SAv5 protocol. Previous work has considered the message-passing sub-protocol of SAv5 in isolation, and considered some aspects of the intended security properties. In contrast, we formally model and analyse the complex composition of the protocol’s sub-protocols. In doing so, we consider the full state machine, the protocol’s asymmetric mode, and the possibility of cross-protocol attacks. Furthermore, we model fine-grained security properties that closely match the standard’s intended security properties. For our analysis, we leverage the Tamarin prover for the symbolic analysis of security protocols. Our analysis shows that the core DNP3: SAv5 design meets its intended security properties. Notably, we show that a previously reported attack does not apply to the standard. However, our analysis also leads to several concrete recommendations for improving future versions of the standard.

In the past few years secure messaging has become mainstream, with over a billion active users of end-to-end encryption protocols such as Signal. The Signal Protocol provides a strong property called post-compromise security to its users. However, it turns out that many of its implementations provide, without notification, a weaker property for group messaging: an adversary who compromises a single group member can read and inject messages indefinitely. We show for the first time that post-compromise security can be achieved in realistic, asynchronous group messaging systems. We present a design called Asynchronous Ratcheting Trees (ART), which uses tree-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange to allow a group of users to derive a shared symmetric key even if no two are ever online at the same time. ART scales to groups containing thousands of members, while still providing provable security guarantees. It has seen significant interest from industry, and forms the basis for two draft IETF RFCs and a chartered working group. Our results show that strong security guarantees for group messaging are practically achievable in a modern setting.

We develop foundations and several constructions for security protocols that can automatically detect, without false positives, if a secret (such as a key or password) has been misused. Such constructions can be used, e.g., to automatically shut down compromised services, or to automatically revoke misused secrets to minimize the effects of compromise. Our threat model includes malicious agents, (temporarily or permanently) compromised agents, and clones.Previous works have studied domain-specific partial solutions to this problem. For example, Google's Certificate Transparency aims to provide infrastructure to detect the misuse of a certificate authority's signing key, logs have been used for detecting endpoint compromise, and protocols have been proposed to detect cloned RFID/smart cards. Contrary to these existing approaches, for which the designs are interwoven with domain-specific considerations and which usually do not enable fully automatic response (i.e., they need human assessment), our approach shows where automatic action is possible. Our results unify, provide design rationales, and suggest improvements for the existing domain-specific solutions.Based on our analysis, we construct several mechanisms for the detection of misuse. Our mechanisms enable automatic response, such as revoking keys or shutting down services, thereby substantially limiting the impact of a compromise.In several case studies, we show how our mechanisms can be used to substantially increase the security guarantees of a wide range of systems, such as web logins, payment systems, or electronic door locks. For example, we propose and formally verify an improved version of Cloudflare's Keyless SSL protocol that enables key misuse detection.

Suppose that a polynomial-time mixed-state quantum circuit, described as a sequence of local unitary interactions followed by a partial trace, generates a quantum state shared between two parties. One might then wonder, does this quantum circuit produce a state that is separable or entangled? Here, we give evidence that it is computationally hard to decide the answer to this question, even if one has access to the power of quantum computation. We begin by exhibiting a two-message quantum interactive proof system that can decide the answer to a promise version of the question. We then prove that the promise problem is hard for the class of promise problems with "quantum statistical zero knowledge" (QSZK) proof systems by demonstrating a polynomial-time Karp reduction from the QSZK-complete promise problem "quantum state distinguish ability" to our quantum separability problem. By exploiting Knill's efficient encoding of a matrix description of a state into a description of a circuit to generate the state, we can show that our promise problem is NP-hard with respect to Cook reductions. Thus, the quantum separability problem (as phrased above) constitutes the first nontrivial promise problem decidable by a two-message quantum interactive proof system while being hard for both NP and QSZK. We also consider a variant of the problem, in which a given polynomial-time mixed-state quantum circuit accepts a quantum state as input, and the question is to decide if there is an input to this circuit which makes its output separable across some bipartite cut. We prove that this problem is a complete promise problem for the class QIP of problems decidable by quantum interactive proof systems. Finally, we show that a two-message quantum interactive proof system can also decide a multipartite generalization of the quantum separability problem.