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Chiara Farronato

dblp:300/2443 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-8493-2889ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › information exchange
data sharing
0.912025
Designing Consent: Choice Architecture and Consumer Welfare in Data Sharing · EC 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
social welfare
0.912025
Designing Consent: Choice Architecture and Consumer Welfare in Data Sharing · EC 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

structural modeling · 0.9field experiment · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Designing Consent: Choice Architecture and Consumer Welfare in Data Sharing
abstract
Regulations mandating consumer consent for data collection and use have led firms to employ "dark patterns"—interface designs that encourage data sharing. We study the causal effects of these designs on consumer consent choices and explore their implications for consumer welfare. We conduct a field experiment where a browser extension randomizes consent interfaces while study participants browse the internet. We find that consumers accept all cookies over half of the time absent dark patterns, with substantial user heterogeneity. Hiding options behind an extra click significantly sways choices toward visible options, while purely visual manipulations have smaller impacts. Users also frequently close banners without active selection, highlighting the importance of default settings. While better-known firms achieve higher baseline consent rates, dark patterns do not amplify this advantage. We use a structural model to show that the consumer surplus-maximizing banner removes dark patterns and defaults to accepting cookies upon consumer inaction. A browser-level global consent choice further improves consumer welfare compared to site-by-site consent interactions, primarily by reducing time costs.
Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin, Tesary Lin
EC1