Firms' algorithm development practices are often homogeneous Whether firms train algorithms on similar data or rely on similar pre-trained models, the result is correlated predictions. In the context of personalized pricing, correlated algorithms can be viewed as a means to collude among competing firms, but whether or not this conduct is legal depends on the mechanisms of achieving collusion. We investigate the precise mechanisms through a formal game-theoretic model. Indeed, we find that (1) higher correlation diminishes consumer welfare and (2) as consumers become more price sensitive, firms are increasingly incentivized to compromise on the accuracy of their predictions in exchange for coordination. We demonstrate our theoretical results in a stylized empirical study where two firms compete using personalized pricing algorithms. Our results demonstrate a new mechanism for achieving collusion through correlation, which allows us to analyze its legal implications. Correlation through algorithms is a new frontier of anti-competitive behavior that is largely unconsidered by US antitrust law.

We study critical systems that allocate scarce resources to satisfy basic needs, such as homeless services that provide housing. These systems often support communities disproportionately affected by systemic racial, gender, or other injustices, so it is crucial to design these systems with fairness considerations in mind. To address this problem, we propose a framework for evaluating fairness in contextual resource allocation systems that is inspired by fairness metrics in machine learning. This framework can be applied to evaluate the fairness properties of a historical policy, as well as to impose constraints in the design of new (counterfactual) allocation policies. Our work culminates with a set of incompatibility results that investigate the interplay between the different fairness metrics we propose. Notably, we demonstrate that: 1) fairness in allocation and fairness in outcomes are usually incompatible; 2) policies that prioritize based on a vulnerability score will usually result in unequal outcomes across groups, even if the score is perfectly calibrated; 3) policies using contextual information beyond what is needed to characterize baseline risk and treatment effects can be fairer in their outcomes than those using just baseline risk and treatment effects; and 4) policies using group status in addition to baseline risk and treatment effects are as fair as possible given all available information. Our framework can help guide the discussion among stakeholders in deciding which fairness metrics to impose when allocating scarce resources.

The increasing use of machine learning in high-stakes domains – where people’s livelihoods are impacted – creates an urgent need for interpretable, fair, and highly accurate algorithms. With these needs in mind, we propose a mixed integer optimization (MIO) framework for learning optimal classification trees – one of the most interpretable models – that can be augmented with arbitrary fairness constraints. In order to better quantify the “price of interpretability”, we also propose a new measure of model interpretability called decision complexity that allows for comparisons across different classes of machine learning models. We benchmark our method against state-of-the-art approaches for fair classification on popular datasets; in doing so, we conduct one of the first comprehensive analyses of the trade-offs between interpretability, fairness, and predictive accuracy. Given a fixed disparity threshold, our method has a price of interpretability of about 4.2 percentage points in terms of out-of-sample accuracy compared to the best performing, complex models. However, our method consistently finds decisions with almost full parity, while other methods rarely do.