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Jingli Hao

dblp:303/5465 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0003-3097-0833ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 50% Systems and software security · 50%
Computer networks
1 paper
Internet of things and sensor networks · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › wireless network security
satellite communication security
0.812024
A Comprehensive Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities and Attacks in Satellite Modems · CCS 2024
Systems and software security
vulnerability analysis
0.812024
A Comprehensive Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities and Attacks in Satellite Modems · CCS 2024
Internet of things and sensor networks › iot security
iot device security
0.212024
A Comprehensive Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities and Attacks in Satellite Modems · CCS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

measurement study · 1.5fuzzing · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 A split-phase PSK demodulation algorithm based on SDR and FPGA implementation
Chao Guo 0002, Jingli Hao, Yuhuang Ye
Soft Comput.3
2024 A Comprehensive Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities and Attacks in Satellite Modems
abstract
Satellite modems are critical components in satellite communication networks. Especially, they determine the entire communication regime in traditional systems where the satellites only act as transparent relays. However, unlike satellites that are usually more isolated and better protected, satellite modems are accessible and susceptible to lower-cost attacks, potentially serving as a weak link in the chain of satellite communication security. We make the first attempt to shed light on satellite modem security. We first physically disassemble commodity satellite modems and systematically examine hardware and software modules. We perform a measurement study on the satellite modems that are exposed to the Internet. We identify 16 security vulnerabilities across three attack surfaces: satellite communication interface, ground network interface, and hardware. We further introduce AirSecAnalyzer, an automated security analyzer/fuzzer for the modems' satellite communication interface. Through comprehensive analysis and extensive experiments on 9 real-world satellite modems, we report 18 novel attacks that exploit the identified vulnerabilities. Our findings are expected to contribute as a valuable foundation for future research on the security of satellite modems and satellite communication networks.
Lingjing Yu, Jingli Hao, Bo Luo
CCS2