Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Kyle Fredrickson
dblp:304/2669
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-0947-2659ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Distributed systems · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security
anonymity networks |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Sparta: Practical Anonymity with Long-Term Resistance to Traffic Analysis · SP 2025 |
Network security › anonymity networks
metadata-private messaging |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Sparta: Practical Anonymity with Long-Term Resistance to Traffic Analysis · SP 2025 |
Network security › anonymity networks
traffic analysis resistance |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Sparta: Practical Anonymity with Long-Term Resistance to Traffic Analysis · SP 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
system construction · 1.7performance evaluation · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Sparta: Practical Anonymity with Long-Term Resistance to Traffic AnalysisabstractExisting metadata-private messaging systems are either non-scalable or vulnerable to long-term traffic analysis. Approaches that mitigate traffic analysis attacks often suffer from unrealistic and unimplementable assumptions or impose system-wide bandwidth restrictions, degrading usability, and performance. In this work, we present a new model for metadata-private communication systems-deferred retrieval-that guarantees traffic analysis resistance under realistic, implementable user assumptions. We introduce Sparta systems, practical and scalable instantiations of deferred retrieval that are distributable, achieve high throughput, and support multiple concurrent conversations without message loss. Specifically, we present three Sparta constructions optimized for different scenarios: (i) low-latency, (ii) high-throughput in shared-memory environments (multi-thread implementations), and (iii) high throughput in shared-nothing (distributed) environments. Our low latency Sparta supports latencies of less than one millisecond, while our high-throughput Sparta can scale to deliver over 700,000 100B messages per second on a single 48-core server. Kyle Fredrickson, Ioannis Demertzis, James P. Hughes 0001, Darrell D. E. Long |
SP | 1 |
| 2021 | A Multiple Snapshot Attack on Deniable Storage SystemsabstractWhile disk encryption is suitable for use in most situations where confidentiality of disks is required, stronger guarantees are required in situations where adversaries may employ coercive tactics to gain access to cryptographic keys. Deniable volumes are one such solution in which the security goal is to prevent an adversary from discovering that there is an encrypted volume. Multiple snapshot attacks, where an adversary is able to gain access to two or more images of a disk, have often been proposed in the deniable storage system literature; however, there have been no concrete attacks proposed or carried out. We present the first multiple snapshot attack, and we find that it is applicable to most, if not all, implemented deniable storage systems. Our attack leverages the pattern of consecutive block changes an adversary would have access to with two snapshots, and demonstrate that with high probability it detects moderately sized and large hidden volumes, while maintaining a low false positive rate. Kyle Fredrickson, Austen Barker, Darrell D. E. Long |
MASCOTS | 1 |