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Max Nadeau

dblp:304/2763 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial examples
0.612022
Robust Feature-Level Adversaries are Interpretability Tools · NeurIPS 2022
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness
0.612022
Robust Feature-Level Adversaries are Interpretability Tools · NeurIPS 2022
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial attack
feature-level attack
0.612022
Robust Feature-Level Adversaries are Interpretability Tools · NeurIPS 2022
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
interpretability
0.612022
Robust Feature-Level Adversaries are Interpretability Tools · NeurIPS 2022
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability
model debugging
0.612022
Robust Feature-Level Adversaries are Interpretability Tools · NeurIPS 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

latent space manipulation · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Robust Feature-Level Adversaries are Interpretability Tools
abstract
The literature on adversarial attacks in computer vision typically focuses on pixel-level perturbations. These tend to be very difficult to interpret. Recent work that manipulates the latent representations of image generators to create "feature-level" adversarial perturbations gives us an opportunity to explore perceptible, interpretable adversarial attacks. We make three contributions. First, we observe that feature-level attacks provide useful classes of inputs for studying representations in models. Second, we show that these adversaries are uniquely versatile and highly robust. We demonstrate that they can be used to produce targeted, universal, disguised, physically-realizable, and black-box attacks at the ImageNet scale. Third, we show how these adversarial images can be used as a practical interpretability tool for identifying bugs in networks. We use these adversaries to make predictions about spurious associations between features and classes which we then test by designing "copy/paste" attacks in which one natural image is pasted into another to cause a targeted misclassification. Our results suggest that feature-level attacks are a promising approach for rigorous interpretability research. They support the design of tools to better understand what a model has learned and diagnose brittle feature associations. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/featureleveladv.
Stephen Casper, Max Nadeau, Dylan Hadfield-Menell, Gabriel Kreiman
NeurIPS2