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Binghan Wang

dblp:304/7646 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0005-7278-7767ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program verification · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange › authenticated key exchange
TLS 1.3 handshake
0.912025
Formally Verifying the State Machine of TLS 1.3 Handshake in OpenSSL · INFOCOM 2025
Program verification › model-based verification
state machine verification
0.312025
Formally Verifying the State Machine of TLS 1.3 Handshake in OpenSSL · INFOCOM 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal verification · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Formally Verifying the State Machine of TLS 1.3 Handshake in OpenSSL
Jingjing Guan, Hui Li 0070, Binghan Wang, Qiuye Wang, Shengchao Qin, Mengda He, Md. Armanuzzaman, Ziming Zhao 0001
INFOCOM5
2024 A Formal Analysis of Data Distribution Service Security
abstract
The Data Distribution Service (DDS) constructs a highly available data transmission middleware based on the publish-subscribe model, widely used in the Internet of Things environment. To improve the security of DDS, the Object Management Group formulated the DDS Security, which provides security mechanisms for DDS in the form of security plugins. However, the security of the DDS Security protocol has not been fully analyzed. We analyze DDS Security through formal methods. We model the security goals and protocol flow of the DDS Security using ProVerif and evaluate whether its security goals can be met in different scenarios. Our analysis confirms previously manually identified vulnerabilities in an automated way and reveals new attacks. We discovered the permission file impersonation attack, the denial of service attack, the degradation attack, and the privacy leakage attack guided by the formal analysis result. For these threats, we propose corresponding mitigation measures and recommendations.
Binghan Wang, Hui Li 0070, Jingjing Guan
AsiaCCS1