Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Nihal Kumarswamy
dblp:304/8313
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-0900-7634ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Computational social science and digital humanities › platform governance
content moderation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Causal Insights into Parler's Content Moderation Shift: Effects on Toxicity and Factuality · WWW 2025 |
Computational social science and digital humanities
social media analysis |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Causal Insights into Parler's Content Moderation Shift: Effects on Toxicity and Factuality · WWW 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
quasi-experimental analysis · 0.9difference-in-differences · 0.9causal inference · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Causal Insights into Parler's Content Moderation Shift: Effects on Toxicity and FactualityabstractSocial media platforms employ various content moderation techniques to remove harmful, offensive, and toxic content, with moderation levels varying across platforms and evolving over time. Parler, a fringe platform popular among conservative users, initially had minimal moderation, promoting itself as a space for open discussion. However, in 2021, it was removed from the Apple and Google App Stores and suspended from Amazon Web Services due to inadequate moderation of harmful content. After a month-long suspension, Parler returned with stricter guidelines, offering a unique opportunity to study the impact of platform-wide policy changes on user behavior and content outcomes. In this paper, we analyzed Parler data to assess the causal associations of these moderation changes on content toxicity and factuality. Using a longitudinal dataset of 17M posts from 432K users, who were active both before and after replatforming, we employed quasi-experimental analysis, controlling for confounding factors. We introduced a novel approach by using data from another social media platform, Twitter, to account for a critical confounding factor: offline events. This allowed us to isolate the effects of Parler's replatforming policies from external real-world influences. Our findings demonstrate that Parler's moderation changes are causally associated with a significant reduction in all forms of toxicity (p < 0.001). Additionally, we observed an increase in the factuality of the news sites shared and a reduction in the number of conspiracy/ pseudoscience sources. Nihal Kumarswamy, Mohit Singhal, Shirin Nilizadeh |
WWW | 1 |
| 2023 | SoK: Content Moderation in Social Media, from Guidelines to Enforcement, and Research to PracticeabstractSocial media platforms have been establishing content moderation guidelines and employing various moderation policies to counter hate speech and misinformation. The goal of this paper is to study these community guidelines and moderation practices, as well as the relevant research publications, to identify the research gaps, differences in moderation techniques, and challenges that should be tackled by the social media platforms and the research community. To this end, we study and analyze fourteen most popular social media content moderation guidelines and practices, and consolidate them. We then introduce three taxonomies drawn from this analysis as well as covering over two hundred interdisciplinary research papers about moderation strategies. We identify the differences between the content moderation employed in mainstream and fringe social media platforms. Finally, we have in-depth applied discussions on both research and practical challenges and solutions. Mohit Singhal, Chen Ling 0004, Pujan Paudel, Poojitha Thota, Nihal Kumarswamy, Gianluca Stringhini, Shirin Nilizadeh |
EuroS&P | 5 |
| 2023 | Cybersecurity Misinformation Detection on Social Media: Case Studies on Phishing Reports and Zoom's ThreatabstractPrior work has extensively studied misinformation related to news, politics, and health, however, misinformation can also be about technological topics. While less controversial, such misinformation can severely impact companies’ reputations and revenues, and users’ online experiences. Recently, social media has also been increasingly used as a novel source of knowledgebase for extracting timely and relevant security threats, which are fed to the threat intelligence systems for better performance. However, with possible campaigns spreading false security threats, these systems can become vulnerable to poisoning attacks. In this work, we proposed novel approaches for detecting misinformation about cybersecurity and privacy threats on social media, focusing on two topics with different types of misinformation: phishing websites and Zoom’s security & privacy threats. We developed a framework for detecting inaccurate phishing claims on Twitter. Using this framework, we could label about 9% of URLs and 22% of phishing reports as misinformation. We also proposed another framework for detecting misinformation related to Zoom’s security and privacy threats on multiple platforms. Our classifiers showed great performance with more than 98% accuracy. Employing these classifiers on the posts from Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, and Twitter, we found respectively that about 18%, 3%, 4%, and 3% of posts were misinformation. In addition, we studied the characteristics of misinformation posts, their authors, and their timelines, which helped us identify campaigns. Mohit Singhal, Nihal Kumarswamy, Shreyasi Kinhekar, Shirin Nilizadeh |
ICWSM | 2 |