Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Tara Poteat
dblp:305/3128
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Authentication and access control · 36% Usable security · 36% Systems and software security · 28% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Empirical software engineering · 100% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network measurement and analytics · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Authentication and access control › password security
password policy |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Investigating the Password Policy Practices of Website Administrators · SP 2023 |
Systems and software security › vulnerability management
vulnerability disclosure |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Who you gonna call?: an empirical evaluation of website security.txt deployment · Internet Measurement Conference 2021 |
Empirical software engineering
developer studies |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Investigating the Password Policy Practices of Website Administrators · SP 2023 |
Network measurement and analytics
web measurement |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Who you gonna call?: an empirical evaluation of website security.txt deployment · Internet Measurement Conference 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
semi-structured interviews · 1.3qualitative study · 1.3online survey · 1.3empirical measurement · 1.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Investigating the Password Policy Practices of Website AdministratorsabstractPasswords are the de facto standard for online authentication today, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. As a consequence, the security community has extensively explored how users behave with passwords, producing recommendations for password policies that promote password security and usability for users. However, it is the website administrators who must adopt such recommendations to enact improvements to online authentication in practice. To date, there has been limited investigation of how web administrators manage password policies for their sites. To improve online authentication at scale, we must understand the factors behind this specific population’s behaviors and decisions, and how to help administrators deploy more secure password policies.In this paper, we explore how web administrators determine the password policies that they employ, what considerations impact a policy’s evolution, and what challenges administrators encounter when managing a site’s policy. To do so, we conduct an online survey and in-depth semi-structured interviews with 11 US-based web administrators with direct experience managing website password policies. Through our qualitative study, we identify a small set of key factors driving the majority of password policy decisions, and barriers that inhibit administrators from enacting policies that are more aligned with modern guidelines. Moving forward, we propose directions for future research and community action that may help administrators manage password policies more effectively. Sena Sahin, Suood Abdulaziz Al-Roomi, Tara Poteat, Frank Li 0001 |
SP | 3 |
| 2021 | Who you gonna call?: an empirical evaluation of website security.txt deploymentabstractThe security.txt proposed standard allows organizations to define how security researchers should disclose security issues. While it is still proceeding through the final stages of standardization, major online services have already adopted the standard (such as Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Github). In this work, we conduct an empirical investigation into how websites are deploying security.txt. We first monitor security.txt adoption over a 15-month period, identifying the level of deployment for top websites. We also characterize the information being provided through security.txt and issues present in the provided data. Ultimately, our analysis sheds light on how the security.txt mechanism manifests in practice and its implications for vulnerability reporting, particularly for large-scale automated notification campaigns. Tara Poteat, Frank Li 0001 |
Internet Measurement Conference | 1 |