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Dan Howarth

dblp:305/9158 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Edge and fog computing · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › virtualization security
container security
0.512021
Container Escape Detection for Edge Devices · SenSys 2021
Edge and fog computing › container orchestration
container deployment
0.112021
Container Escape Detection for Edge Devices · SenSys 2021
Edge and fog computing
edge devices
0.112021
Container Escape Detection for Edge Devices · SenSys 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

semi-supervised machine learning · 1.0linux auditing system · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Container Escape Detection for Edge Devices
abstract
Edge computing is rapidly changing the IoT-Cloud landscape. Various testbeds are now able to run multiple Docker-like containers developed and deployed by end-users on edge devices. However, this capability may allow an attacker to deploy a malicious container on the host and compromise it. This paper presents a dataset based on the Linux Auditing System, which contains malicious and benign container activity. We developed two malicious scenarios, a denial of service and a privilege escalation attack, where an adversary uses a container to compromise the edge device. Furthermore, we deployed benign user containers to run in parallel with the malicious containers. Container activity can be captured through the host system via system calls. Our time series auditd dataset contains partial labels for the benign and malicious related system calls. Generating the dataset is largely automated using a provided AutoCES framework. We also present a semi-supervised machine learning use case with the collected data to demonstrate its utility. The dataset and framework code are open-source and publicly available.
James Pope, Francesco Raimondo, Ryan McConville, Robert J. Piechocki, George C. Oikonomou, Thomas Pasquier, Bo Luo, Dan Howarth, Ioannis Mavromatis, Pietro Edoardo Carnelli, Adrián Sánchez-Mompó, Theodoros Spyridopoulos, Aftab Khan 0001
SenSys9