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Jietao Xiao

dblp:306/1083 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Systems and software security · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers
Cloud and datacenter computing · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › isolation
container isolation
0.712023
Attacks are Forwarded: Breaking the Isolation of MicroVM-based Containers Through Operation Forwarding · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Cloud and datacenter computing › workload isolation
container isolation
0.512021
Demons in the Shared Kernel: Abstract Resource Attacks Against OS-level Virtualization · CCS 2021
Cloud and datacenter computing › virtualization › lightweight virtualization
microVM
0.212023
Attacks are Forwarded: Breaking the Isolation of MicroVM-based Containers Through Operation Forwarding · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Cloud and datacenter computing
virtualization
0.212023
Attacks are Forwarded: Breaking the Isolation of MicroVM-based Containers Through Operation Forwarding · USENIX Security Symposium 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

systematic resource analysis · 1.0dos attack · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Attacks are Forwarded: Breaking the Isolation of MicroVM-based Containers Through Operation Forwarding
Jietao Xiao, Nanzi Yang, Wenbo Shen, Jinku Li, Zhiqiang Dong, Jianfeng Ma 0001
USENIX Security Symposium1
2021 Demons in the Shared Kernel: Abstract Resource Attacks Against OS-level Virtualization
abstract
Due to its faster start-up speed and better resource utilization efficiency, OS-level virtualization has been widely adopted and has become a fundamental technology in cloud computing. Compared to hardware virtualization, OS-level virtualization leverages the shared-kernel design to achieve high efficiency and runs multiple user-space instances (a.k.a., containers) on the shared kernel. However, in this paper, we reveal a new attack surface that is intrinsic to OS-level virtualization, affecting Linux, FreeBSD, and Fuchsia. The root cause is that the shared-kernel design in OS-level virtualization results containers in sharing thousands of kernel variables and data structures directly and indirectly. Without exploiting any kernel vulnerabilities, a non-privileged container can easily exhaust the shared kernel variables and data structure instances to cause DoS attacks against other containers. Compared with the physical resources, these kernel variables or data structure instances (termed abstract resources) are more prevalent but under-protected. To show the importance of confining abstract resources, we conduct abstract resource attacks that target different aspects of the OS kernel. The results show that attacking abstract resources is highly practical and critical. We further conduct a systematic analysis to identify vulnerable abstract resources in the Linux kernel, which successfully detects 1,010 abstract resources and 501 of them can be repeatedly consumed dynamically. We also conduct the attacking experiments in the self-deployed shared-kernel container environments on the top 4 cloud vendors. The results show that all environments are vulnerable to abstract resource attacks. We conclude that containing abstract resources is hard and give out multiple strategies for mitigating the risks.
Nanzi Yang, Wenbo Shen, Jinku Li, Yutian Yang, Kangjie Lu, Jietao Xiao, Chenggang Qin, Jianfeng Ma 0001, Kui Ren 0001
CCS6