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Konrad Hanff

dblp:306/1696 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0001-3635-4658ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Authentication and access control · 38% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 38% Network security · 23%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Authentication and access control
anonymous authentication
0.912025
Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass · CCS 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
security protocol analysis
0.912025
Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass · CCS 2025
Network security
anonymity networks
0.312025
Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass · CCS 2025
Network security › anonymity networks
tor
0.312025
Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass · CCS 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal security analysis · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass
abstract
Privacy Pass is an anonymous authentication protocol which was initially designed by Davidson et al. (PETS'18) to reduce the number of CAPTCHAs that TOR users must solve. It issues single-use authentication tokens with anonymous and unlinkable redemption guarantees. The issuer and verifier of the protocol share a symmetric key, and tokens are privately verifiable. The protocol has sparked interest from both academia and industry, which led to an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard. While Davidson et al. formally analyzed the original protocol, the IETF standard introduces several changes to their protocol. Thus, the standardized version's formal security remains unexamined. We fill this gap by analyzing the IETF standard's privately verifiable Privacy Pass protocol.
Konrad Hanff, Anja Lehmann, Cavit Özbay
CCS1