Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Konrad Hanff
dblp:306/1696
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0001-3635-4658ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Authentication and access control · 38% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 38% Network security · 23% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Authentication and access control
anonymous authentication |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass · CCS 2025 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
security protocol analysis |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass · CCS 2025 |
Network security
anonymity networks |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass · CCS 2025 |
Network security › anonymity networks
tor |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy Pass · CCS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
formal security analysis · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Security Analysis of Privately Verifiable Privacy PassabstractPrivacy Pass is an anonymous authentication protocol which was initially designed by Davidson et al. (PETS'18) to reduce the number of CAPTCHAs that TOR users must solve. It issues single-use authentication tokens with anonymous and unlinkable redemption guarantees. The issuer and verifier of the protocol share a symmetric key, and tokens are privately verifiable. The protocol has sparked interest from both academia and industry, which led to an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard. While Davidson et al. formally analyzed the original protocol, the IETF standard introduces several changes to their protocol. Thus, the standardized version's formal security remains unexamined. We fill this gap by analyzing the IETF standard's privately verifiable Privacy Pass protocol. Konrad Hanff, Anja Lehmann, Cavit Özbay |
CCS | 1 |