EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Joana Pecholt
dblp:307/1669
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-4836-1775ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4 · 2 first-author · 4 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | CoCoRADE: Introducing Replay Protection for Data-at-Rest of Confidential Virtual Machinesabstract561 Joana Pecholt, Maximilian Peisl |
AsiaCCS | 1 |
| 2024 | SOVEREIGN - Towards a Holistic Approach to Critical Infrastructure ProtectionabstractIn the digital age, cyber-threats are a growing concern for individuals, businesses, and governments alike. These threats can range from data breaches and identity theft to large-scale attacks on critical infrastructure. The consequences of such attacks can be severe, leading to financial losses, threats to national security, and the loss of lives. This paper presents a holistic approach to increase the security of critical infrastructures. For that, we propose an open, self-configurable, and AI-based automated cyber-defense platform that runs on specifically hardened devices and own hardware, can be deeply embedded in critical infrastructures and provides full visibility on network, endpoints, and software. In this paper, starting from a thorough analysis of related work, we describe the vision of our SOVEREIGN platform in the form of an architecture, discuss individual building blocks, and evaluate it qualitatively with respect to our requirements. Georg T. Becker, Thomas Eisenbarth 0001, Hannes Federrath, Mathias Fischer 0001, Nils Loose, Simon Ott, Joana Pecholt, Stephan Marwedel, Dominik Meyer, Jan Stijohann, Anum Talpur, Matthias Vallentin |
ARES | 7 |
| 2023 | Universal Remote Attestation for Cloud and Edge PlatformsabstractWith more computing workloads being shifted to the cloud, verifying the integrity of remote software stacks through remote attestation becomes an increasingly important topic. During remote attestation, a prover provides attestation evidence to a verifier, backed by a hardware trust anchor. While generating this information, which is essentially a list of hashes, is easy, examining the trustworthiness of the overall platform based on the provided list of hashes without context is difficult. Furthermore, as different trust anchors use different formats, interaction between devices using different attestation technologies is a complex problem. Simon Ott, Monika Kamhuber, Joana Pecholt, Sascha Wessel |
ARES | 3 |
| 2022 | CoCoTPM: Trusted Platform Modules for Virtual Machines in Confidential Computing EnvironmentsabstractCloud computing has gained popularity and is increasingly used to process sensitive and valuable data. This development necessitates the protection of data from the cloud provider and results in a trend towards confidential computing. Hardware-based technologies by AMD, Intel and Arm address this and allow the protection of virtual machines and the data processed in them. Unfortunately, these hardware-based technologies do not offer a unified interface for necessary tasks like secure key generation and usage or secure storage of integrity measurements. Moreover, these technologies are oftentimes limited in functionality especially regarding remote attestation. On the other hand, a unified interface is widely used in the area of bare-metal systems to provide these functionalities: the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Joana Pecholt, Sascha Wessel |
ACSAC | 1 |