Hualong Ma

dblp:307/2737 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
8ranked-venue papers
1as first author
8since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0000-5286-1740ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 6 · 1 first-author · 6 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 DataElixir: Purifying Poisoned Dataset to Mitigate Backdoor Attacks via Diffusion Models
abstract
Dataset sanitization is a widely adopted proactive defense against poisoning-based backdoor attacks, aimed at filtering out and removing poisoned samples from training datasets. However, existing methods have shown limited efficacy in countering the ever-evolving trigger functions, and often leading to considerable degradation of benign accuracy. In this paper, we propose DataElixir, a novel sanitization approach tailored to purify poisoned datasets. We leverage diffusion models to eliminate trigger features and restore benign features, thereby turning the poisoned samples into benign ones. Specifically, with multiple iterations of the forward and reverse process, we extract intermediary images and their predicted labels for each sample in the original dataset. Then, we identify anomalous samples in terms of the presence of label transition of the intermediary images, detect the target label by quantifying distribution discrepancy, select their purified images considering pixel and feature distance, and determine their ground-truth labels by training a benign model. Experiments conducted on 9 popular attacks demonstrates that DataElixir effectively mitigates various complex attacks while exerting minimal impact on benign accuracy, surpassing the performance of baseline defense methods.
Jiachen Zhou 0001, Peizhuo Lv, Yibing Lan, Guozhu Meng, Kai Chen 0012, Hualong Ma
AAAI6
2024 SSL-WM: A Black-Box Watermarking Approach for Encoders Pre-trained by Self-Supervised Learning
Peizhuo Lv, Shenchen Zhu, Shengzhi Zhang, Kai Chen 0012, Ruigang Liang, Chang Yue, Fan Xiang, Yuling Cai, Hualong Ma, Guozhu Meng
NDSS10
2024 KGDist: A Prompt-Based Distillation Attack against LMs Augmented with Knowledge Graphs
abstract
With Knowledge Graph (KG) increasingly applied in various fields, the integration of KG has gained significant attention to augment the knowledge-specific task capabilities of language models (LMs). However, constructing and maintaining large KGs, much like LMs, can be expensive and challenging, often requiring extensive domain knowledge and human resources. This makes KG a valuable resource potentially vulnerable to theft threats from attackers. In this paper, we present KGDist, the first prompt-based KG distillation technique for extracting KG knowledge from KG+LM augmented models. Through iterations of prompt-based queries, we can steal a substitute KG containing task domain knowledge from the original KG. First of all, we initialize entities from a small scale task-specific corpus. Then, we construct specific task prompts for querying the victim LMs. According to the model outputs, we iteratively select entities showing strong correlation and reconstruct the relation edges for subsequent prompt crafting. We also propose a multi-granularity prompt construction method for reducing the querying cost. After acquiring the extracted KG, we launch a relation type-based pruning to cut off redundant edges forming cycles decreasing the performance of distilled KGs. We evaluate the effectiveness of KGDist on five benchmark KG+LM models designed for various tasks. Results demonstrate that our attack successfully extracts the distilled KGs with minimal performance degradation (under 2.4%) applied on LMs and less storage space. And also, the mechanism we apply greatly saves API queries compared to brute force method. In addition, further experiments demonstrate that we can split the KG knowledge from the LM noises effectively, and the distilled KGs have similar properties in knowledge distribution and graph structures to the original ones. Our code is available at https://github.com/Haro-M/KGDist.
Hualong Ma, Peizhuo Lv, Kai Chen 0012, Jiachen Zhou 0001
RAID1
2024 MEA-Defender: A Robust Watermark against Model Extraction Attack
abstract
Recently, numerous highly-valuable Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been trained using deep learning algorithms. To protect the Intellectual Property (IP) of the original owners over such DNN models, backdoor-based watermarks have been extensively studied. However, most of such watermarks fail upon model extraction attack, which utilizes input samples to query the target model and obtains the corresponding outputs, thus training a substitute model using such input-output pairs. In this paper, we propose a novel watermark to protect IP of DNN models against model extraction, named MEA-Defender. In particular, we obtain the watermark by combining two samples from two source classes in the input domain and design a watermark loss function that makes the output domain of the watermark within that of the main task samples. Since both the input domain and the output domain of our watermark are indispensable parts of those of the main task samples, the watermark will be extracted into the stolen model along with the main task during model extraction. We conduct extensive experiments on four model extraction attacks, using five datasets and six models trained based on supervised learning and self-supervised learning algorithms. The experimental results demonstrate that MEA-Defender is highly robust against different model extraction attacks, and various watermark removal/detection approaches.
Peizhuo Lv, Hualong Ma, Kai Chen 0012, Jiachen Zhou 0001, Shengzhi Zhang, Ruigang Liang, Shenchen Zhu
SP2
2024 AE-Morpher: Improve Physical Robustness of Adversarial Objects against LiDAR-based Detectors via Object Reconstruction
Shenchen Zhu, Yue Zhao 0018, Kai Chen 0012, Hualong Ma, Cheng'an Wei
USENIX Security Symposium5
2023 DBIA: Data-Free Backdoor Attack Against Transformer Networks
abstract
Recently, transformer architecture has demonstrated its significance in both Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Computer Vision (CV) tasks. Although other network models are known to be vulnerable to the backdoor attack, which embeds triggers in the models and controls the models’ behavior when the triggers are presented, little is known about how such an attack performs on the transformer models. In this paper, we propose DBIA, a novel Data-free1Backdoor Attack against the CV-oriented transformer networks, leveraging the inherent attention mechanism of transformers to generate triggers and injecting the backdoor using a poisoned substitute dataset. We conducted extensive experiments using three benchmark transformers, i.e., ViT, DeiT, and Swin Transformer, on four mainstream image classification tasks, i.e., ImageNet, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Youtube Face. The evaluation results demonstrate that, with fewer resources, our approach can embed backdoors with a high success rate and a low impact on the performance of the victim transformers.
Peizhuo Lv, Hualong Ma, Jiachen Zhou 0001, Ruigang Liang, Kai Chen 0012, Shengzhi Zhang, Yunfei Yang 0001
ICME2
2023 A Data-free Backdoor Injection Approach in Neural Networks
Peizhuo Lv, Chang Yue, Ruigang Liang, Yunfei Yang 0001, Shengzhi Zhang, Hualong Ma, Kai Chen 0012
USENIX Security Symposium6
2023 A Robustness-Assured White-Box Watermark in Neural Networks
abstract
Recently, stealing highly-valuable and large-scale deep neural network (DNN) models becomes pervasive. The stolen models may be re-commercialized, e.g., deployed in embedded devices, released in model markets, utilized in competitions, etc, which infringes the Intellectual Property (IP) of the original owner. Detecting IP infringement of the stolen models is quite challenging, even with the white-box access to them in the above scenarios, since they may have experienced fine-tuning, pruning, functionality-equivalent adjustment to destruct any embedded watermark. Furthermore, the adversaries may also attempt to extract the embedded watermark or forge a similar watermark to falsely claim ownership. In this article, we propose a novel DNN watermarking solution, named$HufuNet$, to detect IP infringement of DNN models against the above mentioned attacks. Furthermore, HufuNet is the first one theoretically proved to guarantee robustness against fine-tuning attacks. We evaluate HufuNet rigorously on four benchmark datasets with five popular DNN models, including convolutional neural network (CNN) and recurrent neural network (RNN). The experiments and analysis demonstrate that HufuNet is highly robust against model fine-tuning/pruning, transfer learning, kernels cutoff/supplement, functionality-equivalent attacks and fraudulent ownership claims, thus highly promising to protect large-scale DNN models in the real world.
Peizhuo Lv, Shengzhi Zhang, Kai Chen 0012, Ruigang Liang, Hualong Ma, Yue Zhao 0018, Yingjiu Li
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.6