Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data.

Simon Mulzer

dblp:308/1275 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer networks
1 paper
Wireless sensing and localization · 50% Physical-layer communications · 50%
Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Physical-layer communications
reconfigurable intelligent surface
0.612022
IRShield: A Countermeasure Against Adversarial Physical-Layer Wireless Sensing · SP 2022
Privacy and data protection › communication privacy › network privacy
wireless privacy
0.212022
IRShield: A Countermeasure Against Adversarial Physical-Layer Wireless Sensing · SP 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

IRS configuration algorithm · 1.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 IRShield: A Countermeasure Against Adversarial Physical-Layer Wireless Sensing
abstract
Wireless radio channels are known to contain information about the surrounding propagation environment, which can be extracted using established wireless sensing methods. Thus, today’s ubiquitous wireless devices are attractive targets for passive eavesdroppers to launch reconnaissance attacks. In particular, by overhearing standard communication signals, eavesdroppers obtain estimations of wireless channels which can give away sensitive information about indoor environments. For instance, by applying simple statistical methods, adversaries can infer human motion from wireless channel observations, allowing to remotely monitor premises of victims. In this work, building on the advent of intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRSs), we propose IRShield as a novel countermeasure against adversarial wireless sensing. IRShield is designed as a plug-and-play privacy-preserving extension to existing wireless networks. At the core of IRShield, we design an IRS configuration algorithm to obfuscate wireless channels. We validate the effectiveness with extensive experimental evaluations. In a state-of-the-art human motion detection attack using off-the-shelf Wi-Fi devices, IRShield lowered detection rates to 5% or less.
Paul Staat, Simon Mulzer, Stefan Roth 0004, Veelasha Moonsamy, Markus Heinrichs, Rainer Kronberger, Aydin Sezgin, Christof Paar
SP2