EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Simon Mulzer
dblp:308/1275
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Wireless sensing and localization · 50% Physical-layer communications · 50% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Privacy and data protection · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Physical-layer communications
reconfigurable intelligent surface |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | IRShield: A Countermeasure Against Adversarial Physical-Layer Wireless Sensing · SP 2022 |
Privacy and data protection › communication privacy › network privacy
wireless privacy |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | IRShield: A Countermeasure Against Adversarial Physical-Layer Wireless Sensing · SP 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
IRS configuration algorithm · 1.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | IRShield: A Countermeasure Against Adversarial Physical-Layer Wireless SensingabstractWireless radio channels are known to contain information about the surrounding propagation environment, which can be extracted using established wireless sensing methods. Thus, today’s ubiquitous wireless devices are attractive targets for passive eavesdroppers to launch reconnaissance attacks. In particular, by overhearing standard communication signals, eavesdroppers obtain estimations of wireless channels which can give away sensitive information about indoor environments. For instance, by applying simple statistical methods, adversaries can infer human motion from wireless channel observations, allowing to remotely monitor premises of victims. In this work, building on the advent of intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRSs), we propose IRShield as a novel countermeasure against adversarial wireless sensing. IRShield is designed as a plug-and-play privacy-preserving extension to existing wireless networks. At the core of IRShield, we design an IRS configuration algorithm to obfuscate wireless channels. We validate the effectiveness with extensive experimental evaluations. In a state-of-the-art human motion detection attack using off-the-shelf Wi-Fi devices, IRShield lowered detection rates to 5% or less. Paul Staat, Simon Mulzer, Stefan Roth 0004, Veelasha Moonsamy, Markus Heinrichs, Rainer Kronberger, Aydin Sezgin, Christof Paar |
SP | 2 |