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Pura Peetathawatchai

dblp:308/5683 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Systems and software security · 57% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 43%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Language models and text generation · 77% Trustworthy machine learning · 23%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Computational complexity · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
LLM agents
0.912025
Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models · ICLR 2025
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.912025
Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models · ICLR 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › post-quantum cryptography
lattice-based cryptography
0.712023
Just How Hard Are Rotations of $\mathbb {Z}^n$? Algorithms and Cryptography with the Simplest Lattice · EUROCRYPT (5) 2023
Computational complexity
lattice problems
0.712023
Just How Hard Are Rotations of $\mathbb {Z}^n$? Algorithms and Cryptography with the Simplest Lattice · EUROCRYPT (5) 2023
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › model validation
evaluation of language model capabilities
0.312025
Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models · ICLR 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

subtask decomposition · 1.7agent scaffolding · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models
abstract
Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks for each task, which break down a task into intermediary steps for a more detailed evaluation. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 8 models: GPT-4o, OpenAI o1-preview, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. For the top performing models (GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet), we further investigate performance across 4 agent scaffolds (structured bash, action-only, pseudoterminal, and web search). Without subtask guidance, agents leveraging Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, OpenAI o1-preview, and Claude 3 Opus successfully solved complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve. In comparison, the most difficult task took human teams 24 hours and 54 minutes to solve. Anonymized code and data are available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kp3H0pw1WMAH-Qyyn9WA0ZKmEa7Cr4D4 and https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BcTQ02BBR0m5LYTiK-tQmIK17_TxijIy.
Andy K. Zhang, Neil Perry, Riya Dulepet, Joey Ji, Celeste Menders, Justin W. Lin, Eliot Jones, Gashon Hussein, Samantha Liu, Donovan Jasper, Pura Peetathawatchai, Ari Glenn, Vikram Sivashankar, Daniel Zamoshchin, Leo Glikbarg, Derek Askaryar, Haoxiang Yang, Aolin Zhang, Rishi Alluri, Nathan Tran
ICLR11
2023 Just How Hard Are Rotations of $\mathbb {Z}^n$? Algorithms and Cryptography with the Simplest Lattice
Huck Bennett, Atul Ganju, Pura Peetathawatchai, Noah Stephens-Davidowitz
EUROCRYPT (5)3