We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his payoff without violating the constraints, while that of Player 2 is to violate the state constraints if possible, or to maximize the payoff otherwise. One example of the game is a man-to-man matchup in football. Without state constraints, Cardaliaguet (2007) showed that the value of such a game exists and is convex to the common belief of players. Our theoretical contribution is an extension of this result to games with state constraints and the derivation of the primal and dual subdynamic principles necessary for computing behavioral strategies. Different from existing works that are concerned about the scalability of no-regret learning in games with discrete dynamics, our study reveals the underlying structure of strategies for belief manipulation resulting from information asymmetry and state constraints. This structure will be necessary for scalable learning on games with continuous actions and long time windows. We use a simplified football game to demonstrate the utility of this work, where we reveal player positions and belief states in which the attacker should (or should not) play specific random deceptive moves to take advantage of information asymmetry, and compute how the defender should respond.

Solving Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs (HJI) PDEs numerically enables equilibrial feedback control in two-player differential games, yet faces the curse of dimensionality (CoD). While physics-informed neural networks (PINNs) have shown promise in alleviating CoD in solving PDEs, vanilla PINNs fall short in learning discontinuous solutions due to their sampling nature, leading to poor safety performance of the resulting policies when values are discontinuous due to state or temporal logic constraints. In this study, we explore three potential solutions to this challenge: 1) a hybrid learning method that is guided by both supervisory equilibria and the HJI PDE, 2) a value-hardening method where a sequence of HJIs are solved with increasing Lipschitz constant on the constraint violation penalty, and 3) the epigraphical technique that lifts the value to a higher dimensional state space where it becomes continuous. Evaluations through 5-D and 9-D vehicle and 13-D drone simulations reveal that the hybrid method outperforms others in terms of generalization and safety performance by taking advantage of both the supervisory equilibrium values and co-states, and the low cost of PINN loss gradients.

Finding Nash equilibrial policies for two-player differential games requires solving Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) PDEs. Self-supervised learning has been used to approximate solutions of such PDEs while circumventing the curse of dimensionality. However, this method fails to learn discontinuous PDE solutions due to its sampling nature, leading to poor safety performance of the resulting controllers in robotics applications when player rewards are discontinuous. This paper investigates two potential solutions to this problem: a hybrid method that leverages both supervised Nash equilibria and the HJI PDE, and a value-hardening method where a sequence of HJIs are solved with a gradually hardening reward. We compare these solutions using the resulting generalization and safety performance in two vehicle interaction simulation studies with 5D and 9D state spaces, respectively. Results show that with informative supervision (e.g., collision and near-collision demonstrations) and the low cost of self-supervised learning, the hybrid method achieves better safety performance than the supervised, self-supervised, and value hardening approaches on equal computational budget. Value hardening fails to generalize in the higher-dimensional case without informative supervision. Lastly, we show that the neural activation function needs to be continuously differentiable for learning PDEs and its choice can be case dependent.