Information markets benefit the communities they serve by facilitating electronic distributed exchange and enhancing knowledge sharing, innovation, and productivity. This research explores innovative market mechanisms to build incentives while encouraging pro-social behavior. A key advantage of this study is a direct appeal to theories of information economics and macro policies to market design. We built and deployed a web-based software platform called Barter at several universities. Preliminary analysis of user data helps test information market effectiveness and illustrate effects of various market interventions. We present our design framework, demonstrate why such an architecture provides sustainable incentives, and list key findings learned in the process of system deployment.

We examine how exercising control over a technology platform can increase profits and innovation. Benefits depend on using a platform as a governance mechanism to influence ecosystem parters. Results can inform innovation strategy, antitrust and intellectual property law, and management of competition.

We explore an alternative approach to spam based on eco-nomic rather than technological or regulatory screening mech-anisms. We employ a model of email value which sup-ports two intuitive notions: 1) mechanisms designed to pro-mote valuable communication can often outperform those designed merely to block wasteful communication, and 2) designers of such mechanisms should shift focus away from the information in the message to the information known to the sender. We then use principles of information asymme-try to cause people who knowingly misuse communication to incur higher costs than those who do not. In certain cases, though not all, we can show this approach leaves re-cipients better off than even an idealized or “perfect ” filter that costs nothing and makes no mistakes. Our mechanism also accounts for individual differences in opportunity costs, and allows for bi-directional wealth transfers while facilitat-ing both sender signaling and recipient screening. 1

Article Free Access Share on Information technology— a source of friction?: an analytical model of how firms combat price competition online Authors: Neveen I. Farag University of Michigan, School of Business, 701 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI University of Michigan, School of Business, 701 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MIView Profile , Marshall W. van Alstyne School of Information, University of Michigan, 550 E. University Ave., Ann Arbor, MI School of Information, University of Michigan, 550 E. University Ave., Ann Arbor, MIView Profile Authors Info & Claims EC '00: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerceOctober 2000 Pages 135–144https://doi.org/10.1145/352871.352886Published:17 October 2000Publication History 1citation305DownloadsMetricsTotal Citations1Total Downloads305Last 12 Months11Last 6 weeks1 Get Citation AlertsNew Citation Alert added!This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.Manage my AlertsNew Citation Alert!Please log in to your account Save to BinderSave to BinderCreate a New BinderNameCancelCreateExport CitationPublisher SiteeReaderPDF

Article Free Access Share on Internetwork externalities and free information goods Authors: Geoffrey G. Parker Tulane University, Freeman School of Business, New Orleans, LA Tulane University, Freeman School of Business, New Orleans, LAView Profile , Marshall W. Van Alstyne University of Michigan, School of Information, Ann Arbor, MI University of Michigan, School of Information, Ann Arbor, MIView Profile Authors Info & Claims EC '00: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerceOctober 2000 Pages 107–116https://doi.org/10.1145/352871.352883Online:17 October 2000Publication History 26citation992DownloadsMetricsTotal Citations26Total Downloads992Last 12 Months104Last 6 weeks19 Get Citation AlertsNew Citation Alert added!This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.Manage my Alerts New Citation Alert!Please log in to your account Save to BinderSave to BinderCreate a New BinderNameCancelCreateExport CitationPublisher SiteeReaderPDF