EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Aseem Brahma
dblp:31/8576
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2012
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › prediction markets
automated market makers |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | A bayesian market maker · EC 2012 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
prediction markets |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | A bayesian market maker · EC 2012 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
logarithmic market scoring rule · 0.1bayesian learning · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | A bayesian market makerabstractEnsuring sufficient liquidity is one of the key challenges for designers of prediction markets. Variants of the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) have emerged as the standard. LMSR market makers are loss-making in general and need to be subsidized. Proposed variants, including liquidity sensitive market makers, suffer from an inability to react rapidly to jumps in population beliefs. In this paper we propose a Bayesian Market Maker for binary outcome (or continuous 0-1) markets that learns from the informational content of trades. By sacrificing the guarantee of bounded loss, the Bayesian Market Maker can simultaneously offer: (1) significantly lower expected loss at the same level of liquidity, and, (2) rapid convergence when there is a jump in the underlying true value of the security. We present extensive evaluations of the algorithm in experiments with intelligent trading agents and in human subject experiments. Our investigation also elucidates some general properties of market makers in prediction markets. In particular, there is an inherent tradeoff between adaptability to market shocks and convergence during market equilibrium. Aseem Brahma, Mithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Malik Magdon-Ismail |
EC | 1 |