Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Yutong Wu 0009
dblp:312/5805
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
4as first author
6since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-4771-9461ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 3 first-author · 4 since 2021Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
6 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 94% Network security · 3% Privacy and data protection · 3% | |
| Artificial intelligence
4 papers |
Generative modeling · 65% Multi-agent systems · 28% Language models and text generation · 7% |
Topics — the 12 heaviest of 14, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
2.2 | 3 | 2024 | Backdooring Multimodal Learning · SP 2024 Personalization as a Shortcut for Few-Shot Backdoor Attack against Text-to-Image Diffusion Models · AAAI 2024 Computation and Data Efficient Backdoor Attacks · ICCV 2023 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
1.4 | 2 | 2024 | Backdooring Multimodal Learning · SP 2024 Computation and Data Efficient Backdoor Attacks · ICCV 2023 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling
diffusion model |
1.0 | 2 | 2025 | Personalization as a Shortcut for Few-Shot Backdoor Attack against Text-to-Image Diffusion Models · AAAI 2024 THEMIS: Regulating Textual Inversion for Personalized Concept Censorship · NDSS 2025 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems › multimodal agent
vision-language model agent |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Cowpox: Towards the Immunity of VLM-based Multi-Agent Systems · ICML 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
generative model safety |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | THEMIS: Regulating Textual Inversion for Personalized Concept Censorship · NDSS 2025 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling › diffusion model › text-to-image generation
text-to-image diffusion model |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Personalization as a Shortcut for Few-Shot Backdoor Attack against Text-to-Image Diffusion Models · AAAI 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | You Only Query Once: An Efficient Label-Only Membership Inference Attack · ICLR 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
multimodal backdoor attacks |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Backdooring Multimodal Learning · SP 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
training data poisoning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Backdooring Multimodal Learning · SP 2024 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling › diffusion model › text-to-image generation
personalized text-to-image generation |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | THEMIS: Regulating Textual Inversion for Personalized Concept Censorship · NDSS 2025 |
Network security
attack propagation |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Cowpox: Towards the Immunity of VLM-based Multi-Agent Systems · ICML 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › large language model › large language model adaptation
personalization |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Personalization as a Shortcut for Few-Shot Backdoor Attack against Text-to-Image Diffusion Models · AAAI 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
provable robustness · 1.7distributed immunization · 1.7textual inversion · 1.5poisoning sample selection · 1.5personalization · 1.5fine-tuning · 1.5dreambooth · 1.5backdoor gradient-based score · 1.5query-efficient attack · 0.8label-only attack · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Cowpox: Towards the Immunity of VLM-based Multi-Agent SystemsabstractVision Language Model (VLM) Agents are stateful, autonomous entities capable of perceiving and interacting with their environments through vision and language. Multi-agent systems comprise specialized agents who collaborate to solve a (complex) task. A core security property is robustness, stating that the system maintains its integrity during adversarial attacks. Multi-agent systems lack robustness, as a successful exploit against one agent can spread and infect other agents to undermine the entire system’s integrity. We propose a defense Cowpox to provably enhance the robustness of a multi-agent system by a distributed mechanism that improves the recovery rate of agents by limiting the expected number of infections to other agents. The core idea is to generate and distribute a special cure sample that immunizes an agent against the attack before exposure. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Cowpox empirically and provide theoretical robustness guarantees. Yutong Wu 0009, Jie Zhang 0073, Yiming Li 0004, Chao Zhang 0008, Qing Guo 0005, Han Qiu 0001, Nils Lukas, Tianwei Zhang 0004 |
ICML | 1 |
| 2025 | THEMIS: Regulating Textual Inversion for Personalized Concept Censorship
Yutong Wu 0009, Jie Zhang 0002, Florian Kerschbaum, Tianwei Zhang 0004 |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2024 | Personalization as a Shortcut for Few-Shot Backdoor Attack against Text-to-Image Diffusion ModelsabstractAlthough recent personalization methods have democratized high-resolution image synthesis by enabling swift concept acquisition with minimal examples and lightweight computation, they also present an exploitable avenue for highly accessible backdoor attacks. This paper investigates a critical and unexplored aspect of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models - their potential vulnerability to backdoor attacks via personalization. By studying the prompt processing of popular personalization methods (epitomized by Textual Inversion and DreamBooth), we have devised dedicated personalization-based backdoor attacks according to the different ways of dealing with unseen tokens and divide them into two families: nouveau-token and legacy-token backdoor attacks. In comparison to conventional backdoor attacks involving the fine-tuning of the entire text-to-image diffusion model, our proposed personalization-based backdoor attack method can facilitate more tailored, efficient, and few-shot attacks. Through comprehensive empirical study, we endorse the utilization of the nouveau-token backdoor attack due to its impressive effectiveness, stealthiness, and integrity, markedly outperforming the legacy-token backdoor attack. Yihao Huang 0001, Felix Juefei-Xu, Qing Guo 0005, Jie Zhang 0002, Yutong Wu 0009, Ming Hu 0003, Tianlin Li, Geguang Pu, Yang Liu 0003 |
AAAI | 5 |
| 2024 | You Only Query Once: An Efficient Label-Only Membership Inference AttackabstractAs one of the privacy threats to machine learning models, the membership inference attack (MIA) tries to infer whether a given sample is in the original training set of a victim model by analyzing its outputs. Recent studies only use the predicted hard labels to achieve impressive membership inference accuracy. However, such label-only MIA approach requires very high query budgets to evaluate the distance of the target sample from the victim model's decision boundary.
We propose YOQO, a novel label-only attack to overcome the above limitation.YOQO aims at identifying a special area (called improvement area) around the target sample and crafting a query sample, whose hard label from the victim model can reliably reflect the target sample's membership. YOQO can successfully reduce the query budget from more than 1,000 times to only ONCE. Experiments demonstrate that YOQO is not only as effective as SOTA attack methods, but also performs comparably or even more robustly against many sophisticated defenses. Yutong Wu 0009, Han Qiu 0001, Shangwei Guo, Jiwei Li 0001, Tianwei Zhang 0004 |
ICLR | 1 |
| 2024 | Backdooring Multimodal LearningabstractDeep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which poison the training set to alter the model prediction over samples with a specific trigger. While existing efforts mainly focus on unimodal scenarios, modern AI systems usually employ multiple modalities to improve the model performance, making multimodal backdoor attacks more practical but structurally more complex due to inherent modality interactions, multiple attack surfaces, unbalanced modality contributions, etc. These factors affect the effectiveness of backdooring multimodal learning significantly but have not been fully investigated yet.To bridge this gap, we present the first data and computation efficient backdoor attacks towards multimodal learning. Our solution consists of two innovations. First, we propose a novel backdoor gradient-based score (BAGS), which can accurately quantify the contribution of each data sample to the backdoor learning at a very early training stage. Therefore, it can greatly save time and computational resources for the attacker. Second, we introduce a searching strategy with two attack modes to efficiently determine the optimal poisoning modalities and data samples.Our methodology leads to the following research outcomes. First, we comprehensively evaluate the proposed solution over state-of-the-art multimodal tasks, models, datasets and settings, to verify its effectiveness, efficiency and transferability. For instance, we only need to poison 0.005% of training samples to attack the Visual Question Answering task with the success rate of >96%. For the Audio Video Speech Recognition task, we poison 0.05% of samples to achieve the success rate of >93%. Second, we disclose several interesting findings during our experiments: (1) poisoning all modalities is not always better than individual ones, sometimes even making the attack worse; (2) modality competition and complementarity coexist in multimodal learning backdoor attacks; (3) A dominant modality in multimodal learning may not dominate the backdoor attacks. We hope this work will spur future research in improving the security of multimodal learning. Code is available at https://github.com/multimodalbags/BAGS_Multimodal. Xingshuo Han, Yutong Wu 0009, Yuan Zhou 0005, Yuan Xu 0033, Han Qiu 0001, Guowen Xu, Tianwei Zhang 0004 |
SP | 2 |
| 2023 | Computation and Data Efficient Backdoor AttacksabstractBackdoor attacks against deep neural network (DNN) models have been widely studied. Various attack techniques have been proposed for different domains and paradigms, e.g., image, point cloud, natural language processing, transfer learning, etc. The most widely-used way to embed a backdoor into a DNN model is to poison the training data. They usually randomly select samples from the benign training set for poisoning, without considering the distinct contribution of each sample to the backdoor effectiveness, making the attack less optimal.A recent work [40] proposed to use the forgetting score to measure the importance of each poisoned sample and then filter out redundant data for effective backdoor training. However, this method is empirically designed without theoretical proofing. It is also very time-consuming as it needs to go through several training stages for data selection. To address such limitations, we propose a novel confidence-based scoring methodology, which can efficiently measure the contribution of each poisoning sample based on the distance posteriors. We further introduce a greedy search algorithm to find the most informative samples for backdoor injection more promptly. Experimental evaluations on both 2D image and 3D point cloud classification tasks show that our approach can achieve comparable performance or even surpass the forgetting score-based searching method while requiring only several extra epochs’ computation of a standard training process. Our code can be found at https://github.com/WU-YU-TONG/computational_efficient_backdoor Yutong Wu 0009, Xingshuo Han, Han Qiu 0001, Tianwei Zhang 0004 |
ICCV | 1 |