We study reserve price optimization in multi-phase second price auctions, where the seller's prior actions affect the bidders' later valuations through a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Compared to the bandit setting in existing works, the setting in ours involves three challenges. First, from the seller's perspective, we need to efficiently explore the environment in the presence of potentially untruthful bidders who aim to manipulate the seller's policy. Second, we want to minimize the seller's revenue regret when the market noise distribution is unknown. Third, the seller's per-step revenue is an unknown, nonlinear random variable, and cannot even be directly observed from the environment but realized values. We propose a mechanism addressing all three challenges. To address the first challenge, we use a combination of a new technique named “buffer periods” and inspirations from Reinforcement Learning (RL) with low switching cost to limit bidders' surplus from untruthful bidding, thereby incentivizing approximately truthful bidding. The second one is tackled by a novel algorithm that removes the need for pure exploration when the market noise distribution is unknown. The third challenge is resolved by an extension of LSVI-UCB, where we use the auction's underlying structure to control the uncertainty of the revenue function. The three techniques culminate in the \underline{C}ontextual-\underline{L}SVI-\underline{U}CB-\underline{B}uffer (CLUB) algorithm which achieves $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^{5/2}\sqrt{K})$ revenue regret, where $K$ is the number of episodes and $H$ is the length of each episode, when the market noise is known and $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^{3}\sqrt{K})$ revenue regret when the noise is unknown with no assumptions on bidders' truthfulness.

We develop a framework for capturing the instrumental value of data production processes, which accounts for two key factors: (a) the context of the agent’s decision-making; (b) how much data or information the buyer already possesses. We "micro-found" our data valuation function by establishing its connection to classic notions of signals and information design in economics. When instantiated in Bayesian linear regression, our value naturally corresponds to information gain. Applying our proposed data value in Bayesian linear regression for monopoly pricing, we show that if the seller can fully customize data production, she can extract the first-best revenue (i.e., full surplus) from any population of buyers, i.e., achieving first-degree price discrimination. If data can only be constructed from an existing data pool, this limits the seller’s ability to customize, and achieving first-best revenue becomes generally impossible. However, we design a mechanism that achieves seller revenue at most $\log(\kappa)$ less than the first-best, where $\kappa$ is the condition number associated with the data matrix. As a corollary, the seller extracts the first-best revenue in the multi-armed bandits special case.

We study risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL), a crucial field due to its ability to enhance decision-making in scenarios where it is essential to manage uncertainty and minimize potential adverse outcomes. Particularly, our work focuses on applying the entropic risk measure to RL problems. While existing literature primarily investigates the online setting, there remains a large gap in understanding how to efficiently derive a near-optimal policy based on this risk measure using only a pre-collected dataset. We center on the linear Markov Decision Process (MDP) setting, a well-regarded theoretical framework that has yet to be examined from a risk-sensitive standpoint. In response, we introduce two provably sample-efficient algorithms. We begin by presenting a risk-sensitive pessimistic value iteration algorithm, offering a tight analysis by leveraging the structure of the risk-sensitive performance measure. To further improve the obtained bounds, we propose another pessimistic algorithm that utilizes variance information and reference-advantage decomposition, effectively improving both the dependence on the space dimension $d$ and the risk-sensitivity factor. To the best of our knowledge, we obtain the first provably efficient risk-sensitive offline RL algorithms.

Dynamic mechanism design studies how mechanism designers should allocate resources among agents in a time-varying environment. We consider the problem where the agents interact with the mechanism designer according to an unknown Markov Decision Process (MDP), where agent rewards and the mechanism designer's state evolve according to an episodic MDP with unknown reward functions and transition kernels. We focus on the online setting with linear function approximation and propose novel learning algorithms to recover the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism over multiple rounds of interaction. A key contribution of our approach is incorporating reward-free online Reinforcement Learning (RL) to aid exploration over a rich policy space to estimate prices in the dynamic VCG mechanism. We show that the regret of our proposed method is upper bounded by $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ and further devise a lower bound to show that our algorithm is efficient, incurring the same $\Omega(T^{2 / 3})$ regret as the lower bound, where $T$ is the total number of rounds. Our work establishes the regret guarantee for online RL in solving dynamic mechanism design problems without prior knowledge of the underlying model.

Although parallelism has been extensively used in Reinforcement Learning (RL), the quantitative effects of parallel exploration are not well understood theoretically. We study the benefits of simple parallel exploration for reward-free RL in linear Markov decision processes (MDPs) and two-player zero-sum Markov games (MGs). In contrast to the existing literature, which focuses on approaches that encourage agents to explore over a diverse set of policies, we show that using a single policy to guide exploration across all agents is sufficient to obtain an almost-linear speedup in all cases compared to their fully sequential counterpart. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this simple procedure is near-minimax optimal in the reward-free setting for linear MDPs. From a practical perspective, our paper shows that a single policy is sufficient and provably near-optimal for incorporating parallelism during the exploration phase.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants’ expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs’ distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded $\ell_2$ generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

High-quality machine learning models are dependent on access to high-quality training data. When the data are not already available, it is tedious and costly to obtain them. Data markets help with identifying valuable training data: model consumers pay to train a model, the market uses that budget to identify data and train the model (the budget allocation problem), and finally the market compensates data providers according to their data contribution (revenue allocation problem). For example, a bank could pay the data market to access data from other financial institutions to train a fraud detection model. Compensating data contributors requires understanding data’s contribution to the model; recent efforts to solve this revenue allocation problem based on the Shapley value are inefficient to lead to practical data markets. In this paper, we introduce a new algorithm to solve budget allocation and revenue allocation problems simultaneously in linear time. The new algorithm employs an adaptive sampling process that selects data from those providers who are contributing the most to the model. Better data means that the algorithm accesses those providers more often, and more frequent accesses corresponds to higher compensation. Furthermore, the algorithm can be deployed in both centralized and federated scenarios, boosting its applicability. We provide theoretical guarantees for the algorithm that show the budget is used efficiently and the properties of revenue allocation are similar to Shapley’s. Finally, we conduct an empirical evaluation to show the performance of the algorithm in practical scenarios and when compared to other baselines. Overall, we believe that the new algorithm paves the way for the implementation of practical data markets.

Dynamic mechanism design has garnered significant attention from both computer scientists and economists in recent years. By allowing agents to interact with the seller over multiple rounds, where agents’ reward functions may change with time and are state-dependent, the framework is able to model a rich class of real-world problems. In these works, the interaction between agents and sellers is often assumed to follow a Markov Decision Process (MDP). We focus on the setting where the reward and transition functions of such an MDP are not known a priori, and we are attempting to recover the optimal mechanism using an a priori collected data set. In the setting where the function approximation is employed to handle large state spaces, with only mild assumptions on the expressiveness of the function class, we are able to design a dynamic mechanism using offline reinforcement learning algorithms. Moreover, learned mechanisms approximately have three key desiderata: efficiency, individual rationality, and truthfulness. Our algorithm is based on the pessimism principle and only requires a mild assumption on the coverage of the offline data set. To the best of our knowledge, our work provides the first offline RL algorithm for dynamic mechanism design without assuming uniform coverage.