Networked Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are proprietary industrial devices utilized in critical infrastructure that execute control logic applications in complex proprietary runtime environments that provide standardized access to the hardware resources in the PLC. These control applications are programmed in domain-specific IEC 61131-3 languages, compiled into a proprietary binary format, and process data provided via industrial protocols. Control applications present an attack surface threatened by manipulated traffic. For example, remote code injection in a control application would directly allow to take over the PLC, threatening physical process damage and the safety of human operators. However, assessing the security of control applications is challenging due to domain-specific challenges and the limited availability of suitable methods. Network-based fuzzing is often the only way to test such devices but is inefficient without guidance from execution tracing.

Use of Machine Learning (ML) to understand underlying patterns in gene mutations (genomics) has far-reaching results in diagnosis and treatment for life-threatening diseases like cancer. Success and sustainability of ML algorithms depends on the quality and diversity of training data, and under-representation of groups (gender, race, etc.) can lead to exacerbation of systemic discrimination issues. In this work, we propose TRAPDOOR, a methodology for the identification of biased datasets by repurposing, otherwise malicious, neural backdoors. Our methodology can leak potential bias information about the cloud’s dataset which is collected in a collaborative setting, without hampering the genuine performance. Using a real-world cancer genomics dataset, we analyze feasibility of leaking bias for gender and race attributes. Our experimental results show that TRAPDOOR can detect the presence of dataset bias with 100% accuracy, and furthermore can also extract the extent of bias by recovering the percentage with a small error.