Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Oscar Villemaud
dblp:314/5758
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Mathematical optimization · 50% Information theory · 50% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Probabilistic and Bayesian machine learning · 69% Efficient and distributed learning · 31% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Recommender systems · 100% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Probabilistic and Bayesian machine learning › structured prediction › ranking model
bradley-terry model |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Generalized Bradley-Terry Models for Score Estimation from Paired Comparisons · AAAI 2024 |
Mathematical optimization › continuous optimization
convex optimization |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Generalized Bradley-Terry Models for Score Estimation from Paired Comparisons · AAAI 2024 |
Information theory › estimation theory › bayesian estimation
MAP inference |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Generalized Bradley-Terry Models for Score Estimation from Paired Comparisons · AAAI 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › adversarial example generation
gradient-based attack |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | An Equivalence Between Data Poisoning and Byzantine Gradient Attacks · ICML 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | An Equivalence Between Data Poisoning and Byzantine Gradient Attacks · ICML 2022 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | An Equivalence Between Data Poisoning and Byzantine Gradient Attacks · ICML 2022 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › federated learning
personalized federated learning |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | An Equivalence Between Data Poisoning and Byzantine Gradient Attacks · ICML 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
gaussian prior · 2.3exponential family models · 2.3convex optimization · 2.3impossibility theorems · 1.1PAC learning theory · 1.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Generalized Bradley-Terry Models for Score Estimation from Paired ComparisonsabstractMany applications, e.g. in content recommendation, sports, or recruitment, leverage the comparisons of alternatives to score those alternatives. The classical Bradley-Terry model and its variants have been widely used to do so. The historical model considers binary comparisons (victory/defeat) between alternatives, while more recent developments allow finer comparisons to be taken into account. In this article, we introduce a probabilistic model encompassing a broad variety of paired comparisons that can take discrete or continuous values. We do so by considering a well-behaved subset of the exponential family, which we call the family of generalized Bradley-Terry (GBT) models, as it includes the classical Bradley-Terry model and many of its variants. Remarkably, we prove that all GBT models are guaranteed to yield a strictly convex negative log-likelihood. Moreover, assuming a Gaussian prior on alternatives' scores, we prove that the maximum a posteriori (MAP) of GBT models, whose existence, uniqueness and fast computation are thus guaranteed, varies monotonically with respect to comparisons (the more A beats B, the better the score of A) and is Lipschitz-resilient with respect to each new comparison (a single new comparison can only have a bounded effect on all the estimated scores). These desirable properties make GBT models appealing for practical use. We illustrate some features of GBT models on simulations. Julien Fageot, Sadegh Farhadkhani, Lê-Nguyên Hoang, Oscar Villemaud |
AAAI | 4 |
| 2024 | Robust Sparse VotingabstractMany applications, such as content moderation and recommendation, require reviewing and scoring a large number of alternatives. Doing so robustly is however very challenging. Indeed, voters’ inputs are inevitably sparse: most alternatives are only scored by a small fraction of voters. This sparsity amplifies the effects of biased voters introducing unfairness, and of malicious voters seeking to hack the voting process by reporting dishonest scores. We give a precise definition of the problem of robust sparse voting, highlight its underlying technical challenges, and present a novel voting mechanism addressing the problem. We prove that, using this mechanism, no voter can have more than a small parameterizable effect on each alternative’s score; a property we call Lipschitz resilience. We also identify conditions of voters comparability under which any unanimous preferences can be recovered, even when each voter provides sparse scores, on a scale that is potentially very different from any other voter’s score scale. Proving these properties required us to introduce, analyze and carefully compose novel aggregation primitives which could be of independent interest. Youssef Allouah, Rachid Guerraoui, Lê-Nguyên Hoang, Oscar Villemaud |
AISTATS | 4 |
| 2022 | An Equivalence Between Data Poisoning and Byzantine Gradient AttacksabstractTo study the resilience of distributed learning, the “Byzantine" literature considers a strong threat model where workers can report arbitrary gradients to the parameter server. Whereas this model helped obtain several fundamental results, it has sometimes been considered unrealistic, when the workers are mostly trustworthy machines. In this paper, we show a surprising equivalence between this model and data poisoning, a threat considered much more realistic. More specifically, we prove that every gradient attack can be reduced to data poisoning, in any personalized federated learning system with PAC guarantees (which we show are both desirable and realistic). This equivalence makes it possible to obtain new impossibility results on the resilience of any “robust” learning algorithm to data poisoning in highly heterogeneous applications, as corollaries of existing impossibility theorems on Byzantine machine learning. Moreover, using our equivalence, we derive a practical attack that we show (theoretically and empirically) can be very effective against classical personalized federated learning models. Sadegh Farhadkhani, Rachid Guerraoui, Lê-Nguyên Hoang, Oscar Villemaud |
ICML | 4 |