Online platforms have become a key avenue for forming new relationships, especially for queer individuals. However, some individuals, such as those in asexual and aromantic communities (A-Spec), seek forms of relationships that trouble existing frameworks assumed by online platforms, such as dating apps. To investigate A-Spec needs, we conducted an 8-week ARC study with 38 A-Spec participants who have used online platforms for developing relationships. Participants described a mismatch between the design of dating apps and their approach to building relationships, suggesting platform design that combines affordances of dating apps and other social platforms. We thus outline a “process-oriented” paradigm for relationship-building platforms inspired by community design suggestions, supporting participants’ process of first establishing a low-stakes relationship and then co-constructing its properties. We also argue for a “pluralized” approach to defining identity and relationship in the design of online systems, upsetting default assumptions surrounding any given label.

Grassroots organizing requires establishing trust in digital artifacts (like event announcements or calls to action) while navigating significant security threats including surveillance, infiltration, and state violence. Traditional trust infrastructures like PKI and Web of Trust fail to address these specific needs, as they create public records of trust relationships that can expose activist networks and require institutional involvement that may be inaccessible or dangerous for marginalized communities. To address this, we introduce tigro, a novel trust infrastructure and system designed specifically for grassroots organizing contexts. Unlike conventional trust infrastructures, tigro implements a two-tier trust model: ground trust, which cryptographically binds digital annotations to physically vetted individuals, and artifact trust, which enables private, need-to-know sharing of assessments about digital content via annotations. Our protocol begins with an in-person key exchange that establishes a shared cryptographic key, creating a secure bridge between activists' existing physical vetting practices and their digital trust needs. To realize this approach, we define a new cryptographic primitive called an encrypted annotation system (EAS) and construct tigro using structured encryption and anonymous channels. We present two implementations with different security-performance tradeoffs: an efficient version for practical deployment that handles annotations in under a second, and a subliminal version that reveals virtually no metadata. Through this design, tigro enables activists to securely verify digital content without compromising relationship privacy or creating surveillance vulnerabilities, addressing a critical gap in existing trust infrastructure.