The cybersecurity market is rapidly growing in the face of ubiquitous vulnerabilities, with vendors delivering solutions ranging from basic software-based approaches to high-end services for diverse business needs. The sustainability of a cybersecurity business relies on its ability to update its solutions to address ever-changing cyber threats continuously. It requires a substantial customer base for data collection and service enhancement, which, in turn, can attract more customers. Therefore, a novel business model that acknowledges this positive network effect and provides incentives for potential customers is crucial to ensure the success of the cybersecurity business. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework with optimization and a Stackelberg game approach to model the cybersecurity market scenario for a cybersecurity vendor offering both a basic software-based service and a premium service. We delve into the market evolution and characterize the conditions under which the dynamic market converges to a unique equilibrium. The optimal pricing strategy for the vendor is analyzed to leverage the network effects for profit maximization.

A skyrocketing increase in cyber-attacks significantly elevates the importance of secure software development. Companies launch various bug-bounty programs to reward ethical hackers for identifying potential vulnerabilities in their systems before malicious hackers can exploit them. One of the most difficult decisions in bug-bounty programs is appropriately rewarding ethical hackers. This paper develops a model of an inter-temporal reward strategy with endogenous e-hacker behaviors. We formulate a novel game model to characterize the interactions between a software vendor and multiple heterogeneous ethical hackers. The optimal levels of rewards are discussed under different reward strategies. The impacts of ethical hackers’ strategic bug-hoarding and their competitive and collaborative behaviors on the performance of the program are also evaluated. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the inter-temporal reward mechanism in attracting ethical hackers and encouraging early bug reports. Our results indicate that ignoring the ethical hackers’ strategic behaviors could result in setting inappropriate rewards, which may inadvertently encourage them to hoard bugs for higher rewards. In addition, a more skilled e-hacker is more likely to delay their reporting and less motivated to work collaboratively with other e-hackers. Moreover, the vendor gains more from e-hacker collaboration when it could significantly increase the speed or probability of uncovering difficult-to-detect vulnerabilities.

Trams are playing increasingly important role in today's public transport systems, as they are punctual and friendly to the environment, in addition to high capacity compared to buses. But the normal function of this above-ground light rail system can be interrupted by unexpected events. This research adopts the disruption recovery approach used in Munich and Berlin, Germany – the best service acclaimed by the public, to examine the collaboration mechanism with a taxi company to provide fast recovery service during tram disruptions. Because of the spontaneous nature of disruptions, a proactive contract-based collaboration strategy is formulated. The two involving parties’ decision functions are developed and analyzed both individually and interactively as a game to generate the optimal solutions. Numerical sensitivity analysis of critical parameters are conducted to shed more lights on decision-making and implementation.