Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have recently shown promising results for audio synthesis, however, synthesized audio has artifacts and can sound unnatural/mechanical. In the case of speech synthesis, the artifacts can contribute to reduced intelligibility of the generated speech. A new architecture is proposed, TangGAN, that generates audio with less artifacts compared to the current state-of-the-art. This is achieved via the introduction of decimation layers in the discriminator and interpolation layers in the generator of a common GAN architecture to formally address aliasing due to improper sampling. Aliasing occurs in convolutional layers with strides larger than one. To quantify the reduction of artifacts in generated audio three new metrics for evaluating GANs for audio/speech synthesis are introduced: total harmonic distortion (THD), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and Speech-To-Reverberation Modulation Energy Ratio (SRMR). New metrics are necessary, given that results in this study indicate that the commonly used Inception score does not capture human listener perception of quality of generated speech. Results presented in this study demonstrate an improved Inception score over the benchmarked WaveGAN architecture as well as reduction of artifacts in generated speech as quantified by THD (up to 2dB), SNR (up to 5 dB), and SRMR. These improvements are achieved in half the training iterations of TangGAN compared to the WaveGAN architecture.

This paper presents a novel application of computer-assisted formal methods for systematically specifying, documenting, statically and dynamically checking, and maintaining human-centered workflow processes. This approach provides for end-to-end verification and validation of process workflows, which is needed for process workflows that are intended for use in developing and maintaining high-integrity systems. We demonstrate the technical feasibility of our approach by applying it on the development of the US government's process workflow for implementing, certifying, and accrediting cross-domain computer security solutions. Our approach involves identifying human-in-the-loop decision points in the process activities and then modeling these via statechart assertions. We developed techniques to specify and enforce workflow hierarchies, which was a challenge due to the existence of concurrent activities within complex workflow processes. Some of the key advantages of our approach are: it results in development of a model that is executable, supporting both upfront and runtime checking of process-workflow requirements; aids comprehension and communication among stakeholders and process engineers; and provides for incorporating accountability and risk management into the engineering of process workflows.

This paper discusses the use of social media and cloud computing technologies to facilitate the collaboration and communication in enterprise-wide workflow processes. It presents a use case analysis of the US Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) test program management to demonstrate how cloud computing and social media could streamline pre-existing, highly serialized, enterprise-wide workflow processes. The resulting optimizations to the monitoring, reporting, and control aspects will lead to situational awareness information being available to senior leadership with far fewer intermediary, human-in-the-loop steps. These optimizations, when combined with social networking tools and a common integrated working environment for program artifacts, may result in an increase to productivity across all levels of the organization.

This paper presents some concepts, principles, and techniques for automated testing of system-of-systems based on attributed event grammar (AEG) modeling of the system's operational environment. AEG provides a uniform approach for automatically generating, executing, and analyzing tests. Quantitative and qualitative software risk assessment can be performed based on statistics gathered during automatic test execution within the specified environment model.

Formal methods can complement traditional techniques such as testing and can help developers improve the degree of trustworthiness in defense acquisitions. In this paper, we demonstrate an application of formal methods to a system-of-systems development by specifying and verifying part of the controlling software for a ballistic missile defense system. While there is much work to do to institutionalize formal methods in the development of system-of-systems, we believe that this paper represents a point of departure towards that objective.

We propose a system-of-systems construct in which we consider a system-of-systems infrastructure that is composed of controlling software for the system-of-systems, an information transport network, and contract interfaces. We propose that developers create such an infrastructure for an independent system to join the system-of-systems by adherence to the contract interface that is service-oriented and that follows the principles of design-by-contract.

In this paper we discuss the legal developments related to the cyber aspects of homeland security. Through analysis of statutes, executive orders, and case studies, we highlight the rapid development of a new body of law and its consequences for the government, the private sector, and the public at-large.

In this paper we address the development of measured responses to coercive actions. We demonstrate, via a case study of kinetic and cyber attacks on a safety-critical software-intensive system, the application of the Schmitt Analysis to the question of whether the attacks have risen to the level of a "use of force" under international law, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the attacks.

Intelligent software decoys employ deception techniques to maintain the interaction between themselves and calling processes or threads that violate the contracts of the software components that the decoys defend. The software decoy's goal is to learn about the nature of such interactions before either terminating the interaction or treating the calling process or thread as a cyber combatant. Software components can be wrapped at any level of abstraction, from web applets to operating system calls. It is foreseeable that the decoying actions, termination of interaction, or counterattack by the decoy could in some way violate the law of armed conflict. In this paper we examine the response policy of software decoys in terms of discrimination, necessity, proportionality, and chivalry on the cyber battlefield.

The levels of quality, maintainability, testability, and stability of software can be improved and measured through the use of automated testing tools throughout the software development process. Automated testing tools assist software engineers to gauge the quality of software by automating the mechanical aspects of the software-testing task Automated testing tools vary in their underlying approach, quality, and ease-of-use, among other characteristics. In this paper we propose a suite of objective metrics for measuring tool characteristics, as an aid in systematically evaluating and selecting automated testing tools.

The secure management of groups containing thousands or possibly hundreds of thousands of members with very high rates of membership turnover is claimed to be a critical need for high confidence networking. Among the needs mentioned are the ability to ensure that former group members can no longer obtain access to group materials and to prevent new members from accessing material distributed to the group prior to their entry. Suggestions made in this area exhibit a strong bias towards cryptographic techniques and key management to realize these goals, pointing out the weaknesses in currently available techniques. The purpose of the present paper is to examine some of the assumptions that appear to be implicit in these suggestions. An examination of group function and behavior might indicate alternative ways to manage large groups securely. We note that the call for ever more complex technological solutions to problems that may be sociological in nature continues a disturbing (and largely unsuccessful) trend that began in the pre-TCSEC days and that continues into the present.

Errors can arise in defining and evaluating computer security policy as well as in translating computer security policy into procedures.The effect of such errors in policy upon the secure operation of information systems can impose unacceptable levels of risk from the perspective of procurers and users of information systems.Relying on computer security paradigms based solely on formal methods makes it difficult if not impossible to detect and/or reason about certain classes of threats to computer security and vulnerabilities of information systems to these threats, especially for those aspects of information systems that are more readily amenable to modeling via non-formal methods.We present a paradigm integrating formal and heuristic reasoning as a basis for testing for and debugging computer security policy.To illustrate our approach, and to support our arguments, we consider the problem of reasoning about the plans of an agent who may be trying to compromise the security of an information system.

Three significant challenges facing the discipline of software engineering are understanding how software designers reason about policy, understanding how they define requirements based on this reasoning, and providing machine-based intelligent tools that support reasoning about policy. The authors are developing the concept of a policy workbench: knowledge-based tools that support reasoning about such properties of policies as consistency, completeness, and correctness, and the implications of policy for the behavior of a system. They discuss how such a workbench might help software designers reason about the relationships between policies and requirements.>