The leakage of benchmark data into the training data has emerged as a significant challenge for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs). In this work, we challenge the common assumption that small-scale contamination renders benchmark evaluations invalid. First, we experimentally quantify the magnitude of benchmark overfitting based on scaling along three dimensions: The number of model parameters (up to 1.6B), the number of times an example is seen (up to 144), and the number of training tokens (up to 40B). If model and data follow the Chinchilla scaling laws, minor contamination indeed leads to overfitting. At the same time, even 144 times of contamination can be forgotten if the training data is scaled beyond five times Chinchilla, a regime characteristic of many modern LLMs. Continual pre-training of OLMo-7B corroborates these results. Next, we study the impact of the weight decay parameter on example forgetting, showing that empirical forgetting occurs faster than the cumulative weight decay. This allows us to gauge the degree of example forgetting in large-scale training runs, indicating that many LLMs, including Llama 3 405B, have forgotten the data seen at the beginning of training.

A plethora of jailbreaking attacks have been proposed to obtain harmful responses from safety-tuned LLMs. These methods largely succeed in coercing the target output in their original settings, but their attacks vary substantially in fluency and computational effort. In this work, we propose a unified threat model for the principled comparison of these methods. Our threat model checks if a given jailbreak is likely to occur in the distribution of text. For this, we build an N-gram language model on 1T tokens, which, unlike model-based perplexity, allows for an LLM-agnostic, nonparametric, and inherently interpretable evaluation. We adapt popular attacks to this threat model, and, for the first time, benchmark these attacks on equal footing with it. After an extensive comparison, we find attack success rates against safety-tuned modern models to be lower than previously presented and that attacks based on discrete optimization significantly outperform recent LLM-based attacks. Being inherently interpretable, our threat model allows for a comprehensive analysis and comparison of jailbreak attacks. We find that effective attacks exploit and abuse infrequent bigrams, either selecting the ones absent from real-world text or rare ones, e.g., specific to Reddit or code datasets.

Despite excellent average-case performance of many image classifiers, their performance can substantially deteriorate on semantically coherent subgroups of the data that were under-represented in the training data. These systematic errors can impact both fairness for demographic minority groups as well as robustness and safety under domain shift. A major challenge is to identify such subgroups with subpar performance when the subgroups are not annotated and their occurrence is very rare. We leverage recent advances in text-to-image models and search in the space of textual descriptions of subgroups ("prompts") for sub-groups where the target model has low performance on the prompt-conditioned synthesized data. To tackle the exponentially growing number of subgroups, we employ combinatorial testing. We denote this procedure as PromptAttack as it can be interpreted as an adversarial attack in a prompt space. We study subgroup coverage and identifiability with PromptAttack in a controlled setting and find that it identifies systematic errors with high accuracy. Thereupon, we apply PromptAttack to ImageNet classifiers and identify novel systematic errors on rare subgroups.

Benchmark performance of deep learning classifiers alone is not a reliable predictor for the performance of a deployed model. In particular, if the image classifier has picked up spurious features in the training data, its predictions can fail in unexpected ways. In this paper, we develop a framework that allows us to systematically identify spurious features in large datasets like ImageNet. It is based on our neural PCA components and their visualization. Previous work on spurious features often operates in toy settings or requires costly pixel-wise annotations. In contrast, we work with ImageNet and validate our results by showing that presence of the harmful spurious feature of a class alone is sufficient to trigger the prediction of that class. We introduce the novel dataset "Spurious ImageNet" which allows to measure the reliance of any ImageNet classifier on harmful spurious features. Moreover, we introduce SpuFix as a simple mitigation method to reduce the dependence of any ImageNet classifier on previously identified harmful spurious features without requiring additional labels or retraining of the model. We provide code and data at https://github.com/YanNeu/spurious_imagenet.

Visual Counterfactual Explanations (VCEs) are an important tool to understand the decisions of an image classifier. They are “small” but “realistic” semantic changes of the image changing the classifier decision. Current approaches for the generation of VCEs are restricted to adversarially robust models and often contain non-realistic artefacts, or are limited to image classification problems with few classes. In this paper, we overcome this by generating Diffusion Visual Counterfactual Explanations (DVCEs) for arbitrary ImageNet classifiers via a diffusion process. Two modifications to the diffusion process are key for our DVCEs: first, an adaptive parameterization, whose hyperparameters generalize across images and models, together with distance regularization and late start of the diffusion process, allow us to generate images with minimal semantic changes to the original ones but different classification. Second, our cone regularization via an adversarially robust model ensures that the diffusion process does not converge to trivial non-semantic changes, but instead produces realistic images of the target class which achieve high confidence by the classifier.