EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Myles Foley
dblp:320/8506
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
4as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0003-4482-6835ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | DRMD: Deep Reinforcement Learning for Malware Detection Under Concept DriftabstractMalware detection in real-world settings must deal with evolving threats, limited labeling budgets, and uncertain predictions. Traditional classifiers, without additional mechanisms, struggle to maintain performance under concept drift in malware domains, as their supervised learning formulation cannot optimize when to defer decisions to manual labeling and adaptation. Modern malware detection pipelines combine classifiers with monthly active learning (AL) and rejection mechanisms to mitigate the impact of concept drift. In this work, we develop a novel formulation of malware detection as a one-step Markov Decision Process and train a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agent, simultaneously optimizing sample classification performance and rejecting high-risk samples for manual labeling. We evaluated the joint detection and drift mitigation policy learned by the DRL-based Malware Detection (DRMD) agent through time-aware evaluations on Android malware datasets subject to realistic drift requiring multi-year performance stability. The policies learned under these conditions achieve a higher Area Under Time (AUT) performance compared to standard classification approaches used in the domain, showing improved resilience to concept drift. Specifically, the DRMD agent achieved an average AUT improvement of 8.66 and 10.90 for the classification-only and classification-rejection policies, respectively. Our results demonstrate for the first time that DRL can facilitate effective malware detection and improved resiliency to concept drift in the dynamic setting of Android malware detection. Shae McFadden, Myles Foley, Mario D'Onghia, Chris Hicks, Vasilios Mavroudis, Nicola Paoletti, Fabio Pierazzi |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2025 | APIRL: Deep Reinforcement Learning for REST API FuzzingabstractREST APIs have become key components of web services. However, they often contain logic flaws resulting in server side errors or security vulnerabilities. HTTP requests are used as test cases to find and mitigate such issues. Existing methods to modify requests, including those using deep learning, suffer from limited performance and precision, relying on undirected search or making limited usage of the contextual information. In this paper we propose APIRL, a fully automated deep reinforcement learning tool for testing REST APIs. A key novelty of our approach is the use of feedback from a transformer module pre-trained on JSON-structured data, akin to that used in API responses. This allows APIRL to learn the subtleties relating to test outcomes, and generalise to unseen API endpoints. We show APIRL can find significantly more bugs than the state-of-the-art in real world REST APIs while minimising the number of required test cases. We also study how reward functions, and other key design choices, affect learnt policies with a thorough ablation study. Myles Foley, Sergio Maffeis |
AAAI | 1 |
| 2023 | Matching Pairs: Attributing Fine-Tuned Models to their Pre-Trained Large Language ModelsabstractMyles Foley, Ambrish Rawat, Taesung Lee, Yufang Hou, Gabriele Picco, Giulio Zizzo. Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2023. Myles Foley, Ambrish Rawat, Taesung Lee, Yufang Hou 0001, Gabriele Picco, Giulio Zizzo |
ACL (1) | 1 |
| 2023 | SQIRL: Grey-Box Detection of SQL Injection Vulnerabilities Using Reinforcement Learning
Salim Al Wahaibi, Myles Foley, Sergio Maffeis |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2022 | Autonomous Network Defence using Reinforcement LearningabstractIn the network security arms race, the defender is significantly disadvantaged as they need to successfully detect and counter every malicious attack. In contrast, the attacker needs to succeed only once. To level the playing field, we investigate the effectiveness of autonomous agents in a realistic network defence scenario. We first outline the problem, provide the background on reinforcement learning and detail our proposed agent design. Using a network environment simulation, with 13 hosts spanning 3 subnets, we train a novel reinforcement learning agent and show that it can reliably defend continual attacks by two advanced persistent threat (APT) red agents: one with complete knowledge of the network layout and another which must discover resources through exploration but is more general. Myles Foley, Chris Hicks, Kate Highnam, Vasilios Mavroudis |
AsiaCCS | 1 |
| 2022 | Haxss: Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning for XSS Payload GenerationabstractWeb application vulnerabilities are an ongoing problem that current black-box techniques and scanners do not entirely solve, suffering in particular from a lack of payload diversity that prevents them from capturing the long tail of vulnerabilities caused by uncommon sanitisation mistakes.In order to increase the diversity of payloads that can be automatically generated in a black-box fashion, we develop a hierarchical reinforcement learning approach where agents focus separately on the tasks of escaping the current context, and evading sanitisation. We implement this in an end-to-end prototype we call HAXSS.We compare our approach against a number of state-of-the-art black-box scanners on a new micro-benchmark for XSS payload generation, and on a macro-benchmark of established vulnerable web applications. HAXSS outperforms the other scanners on both benchmarks, identifying 131 vulnerabilities (a 20% improvement over the closest scanner), reporting 0 false positives. Finally, we demonstrate that our approach is practically useful, as HAXSS re-discovers 4 existing CVEs and discovers 5 new CVEs in 3 production-grade web applications. Myles Foley, Sergio Maffeis |
TrustCom | 1 |