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Thomas Chamelot

dblp:321/0198 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0001-7037-6407ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 77% Embedded and real-time systems · 23%
Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks
fault injection countermeasures
0.712023
MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks · IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst. 2023
Processor architecture and microarchitecture › pipelining
pipeline control
0.712023
MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks · IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst. 2023
Embedded and real-time systems
embedded system security
0.212023
MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks · IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst. 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

signature-based integrity checking · 1.3CRC32 · 1.3CBC-MAC · 1.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks
abstract
Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art countermeasures, hardware-only or with hardware support, do not consider the integrity of microarchitecture control signals that are the target of these faults. We present MAFIA, a microarchitecture protection against fault injection attacks. MAFIA ensures integrity of pipeline control signals through a signature-based mechanism, and ensures fine-grained control-flow integrity with a complete indirect branch support and code authenticity. We analyze the security properties of two different implementations with different security/overhead tradeoffs: one with a CBC-MAC/Prince signature function, and another one with a CRC32. We present our implementation of MAFIA in a RISC-V processor, supported by a dedicated compiler toolchain based on LLVM/Clang. We report a hardware area overhead of 23.8% and 6.5% for the CBC-MAC/Prince and CRC32, respectively. The average code size and execution time overheads are 29.4% and 18.4%, respectively, for the CRC32 implementation and are 50% and 39% for the CBC-MAC/Prince.
Thomas Chamelot, Damien Couroussé, Karine Heydemann
IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst.1
2022 SCI-FI: Control Signal, Code, and Control Flow Integrity against Fault Injection Attacks
abstract
Fault injection attacks have become a serious threat against embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that some faults inside the microarchitecture escape all typical software fault models and so software counter-measures. Moreover, state-of-the-art counter-measures, hardware-only or with hardware support, do not consider the integrity of microarchitectural control signals that are the target of these faults. We present SCI-FI, a counter-measure for Control Signal, Code, and Control-Flow Integrity against Fault Injection attacks. SCI-FI combines the protection of pipeline control signals with a fine-grained code and control-flow integrity mechanism, and can additionally provide code authentication. We evaluate SCI-FI by extending a RISC-V core. The average hardware area overheads range from 6.5% to 23.8%, and the average code size and execution time increase by 25.4% and 17.5% respectively.
Thomas Chamelot, Damien Couroussé, Karine Heydemann
DATE1