Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Mingde Ren
dblp:322/6483
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0009-1122-5073ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 50% Memory systems · 50% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Hardware security and side channels · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Operating systems · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Coffer: An Efficient and Scalable TEE on RISC-V · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026 |
Memory systems
memory protection |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Coffer: An Efficient and Scalable TEE on RISC-V · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026 |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture › instruction set architecture
RISC-V |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Coffer: An Efficient and Scalable TEE on RISC-V · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
enclave modules · 3.0PMP virtualization · 3.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Coffer: An Efficient and Scalable TEE on RISC-VabstractTrusted Execution Environment(TEE) is a primary means for confidential computing. However, at the moment the RISC-V platform is limited for confidential computing because current RISC-V TEEs either lack scalability or compatibility. The reason for this dilemma in scalability and compatibility is that the standard isolation primitive on RISC-V,Physical Memory Protection(PMP), is not scalable. Meanwhile, previous enclave designs depend on theRich Execution Environment(REE) for OS functionalities, which increases domain switch frequency and enlarges the attack surface of the TEE. In this work, we propose Coffer, a scalable and efficient software-based TEE for the standard RISC-V platform. Coffer includes two core techniques:Logical PMP(LPMP) andEnclave Modules(EModules) to address the issues mentioned above. LPMP is a secure and efficient framework for PMP virtualization. It provides both scalability and hardware compatibility to Coffer. EModules are dynamically assembled lightweight libraries to provide enclaves with OS functionalities. The EModules provide Coffer with software compatibility and reduce theTrusted Computing Base(TCB) size of the enclaves. We implement and evaluate Coffer on commercially available RISC-V devices. The evaluation results show that Coffer can support 2, 000+ concurrent enclaves with negligible performance overhead. Particularly, LPMP supports enclave execution under heavy memory fragmentation with little performance overhead. Mingde Ren, Jiatong Chen, Ziquan Wang, Fengwei Zhang, Zhenyu Ning, Heming Cui |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 1 |