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Zhangsen Wang

dblp:323/3496 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Wireless sensing and localization · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security
voice assistant security
0.712023
MagBackdoor: Beware of Your Loudspeaker as A Backdoor For Magnetic Injection Attacks · SP 2023
Wireless sensing and localization
acoustic sensing
0.212023
MagBackdoor: Beware of Your Loudspeaker as A Backdoor For Magnetic Injection Attacks · SP 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

prototype implementation · 1.3magnetic field simulation · 1.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 MagBackdoor: Beware of Your Loudspeaker as A Backdoor For Magnetic Injection Attacks
abstract
An audio system containing loudspeakers and microphones is the fundamental hardware for voice-enabled devices, enabling voice interaction with mobile applications and smart homes. This paper presents MagBackdoor, the first magnetic field attack that injects malicious commands via a loudspeaker-based backdoor of the audio system, compromising the linked voice interaction system. MagBackdoor focuses on the magnetic threat on loudspeakers and manipulates their sound production stealthily. Consequently, the microphone will inevitably pick up malicious sound generated by the attacked speaker, due to the closely packed arrangement of internal audio systems. To prove the feasibility of MagBackdoor, we conduct comprehensive simulations and experiments. This study further models the mechanism by which an external magnetic field excites the sound production of loudspeakers, giving theoretical guidance to MagBackdoor. Aiming at stealthy magnetic attacks in real-world scenarios, we self-design a prototype that can emit magnetic fields modulated by voice commands. We implement MagBackdoor and evaluate it across a wide range of smart devices involving 16 smartphones, four laptops, two tablets, and three smart speakers, achieving an average 95% injection success rate with high-quality injected acoustic signals.
Tiantian Liu 0002, Feng Lin 0004, Zhangsen Wang, Chao Wang 0097, Zhongjie Ba, Li Lu 0008, Wenyao Xu, Kui Ren 0001
SP3
2022 Fingersound: A Low-cost and Deployable Authentication System with Fingertip Sliding Sound
abstract
Fingerprint recognition technology is the most widely used technology in the field of biometrics and is also the preferred solution for mobile devices and the financial industry. However, traditional fingerprint recognition technology requires expensive sensors on the one hand and risks leaking fingerprint images on the other hand. In this paper, we propose Fingersound, a low-cost and deployable authentication system that utilizes the sound generated by finger sliding as an identity feature. We use a microphone array to record continuous sliding sound and extract multiple features in the frequency and time domains. Then we use various algorithms including a deep neural network to perform user authentication. We also design a mobile phone application that can interact with the embedded system to manage users and record authentication history. In our experiments, 100 participants used this system and achieved an equal error rate of 5.2%. Additionally, we investigate the system’s robustness within different sliding materials, texturesand under noise disturbances. We further demonstrate the resistance of Fingersound to replay attack.
Zhanglei Shu, Zhangsen Wang, Guozheng Yang, Cheng Zang, Feng Lin 0004, Kui Ren 0001
ICPADS2