Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Tailai Zhang
dblp:324/2979
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-0356-4552ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 3 · 3 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Image recognition and object detection · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
1.3 | 2 | 2024 | Physical Backdoor: Towards Temperature-Based Backdoor Attacks in the Physical World · CVPR 2024 Backdoor Attacks on Crowd Counting · ACM Multimedia 2022 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection › object detection
infrared object detection |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Physical Backdoor: Towards Temperature-Based Backdoor Attacks in the Physical World · CVPR 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
physical backdoor attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Physical Backdoor: Towards Temperature-Based Backdoor Attacks in the Physical World · CVPR 2024 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection › object counting
crowd counting |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Backdoor Attacks on Crowd Counting · ACM Multimedia 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
trigger design |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Physical Backdoor: Towards Temperature-Based Backdoor Attacks in the Physical World · CVPR 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | Backdoor Attacks on Crowd Counting · ACM Multimedia 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
temperature-based trigger · 1.5physical trigger design · 1.5density manipulation · 1.1data poisoning · 1.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | TACOS: Open Tagging and Comparative Scoring for Instruction Fine-Tuning Data SelectionabstractInstruction Fine-Timing (IFT) is crucial for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences, and selecting a small yet representative subset from massive data significantly facilitates IFT in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless, existing approaches suffer from two limitations: the use of simple heuristics restricts data diversity, while the singleton data quality evaluation accounts for inconsistent criteria between independent samples. To address the issues, we present TACOS, an innovative method that integrates Open Tagging and Comparative Scoring for IFT data selection. To capture data diversity, we leverage LLMs to assign open-domain tags to human queries, followed by a normalization stage to denoise the open tags and enable efficient clustering. Additionally, we suggest a comparative scoring method that allows the relative quality evaluation of samples within a cluster, avoiding inconsistent criteria seen in singleton-based evaluations. Extensive experiments across diverse datasets and LLM architectures demonstrate that TACOS outperforms existing approaches by a large margin. Notably, it achieves superior instruction-following performance on MT-Bench and ranks 1st among LLaMA2-7B-Based models on AlpacaEval 2.0, illustrating its efficacy for IFT data selection. Xixiang He, Qiyao Sun, Ao Cheng, Tailai Zhang, Shuxuan Guo |
ICME | 5 |
| 2024 | Physical Backdoor: Towards Temperature-Based Backdoor Attacks in the Physical WorldabstractBackdoor attacks have been well-studied in visible light object detection (VLOD) in recent years. However, VLOD can not effectively work in dark and temperature-sensitive scenarios. Instead, thermal infrared object detection (TIOD) is the most accessible and practical in such environments. In this paper, our team is the first to investigate the security vulnerabilities associated with TIOD in the context of backdoor attacks, spanning both the digital and physical realms. We introduce two novel types of backdoor attacks on TIOD, each offering unique capabilities: Object-affecting Attack and Range-affecting Attack. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of key factors influencing trigger design, which include temperature, size, material, and concealment. These factors, especially temperature, significantly impact the efficacy of backdoor attacks on TIOD. A thorough understanding of these factors will serve as a foundation for designing physical triggers and temperature controlling experiments. Our study includes extensive experiments conducted in both digital and physical environments. In the digital realm, we evaluate our approach using benchmark datasets for TIOD, achieving an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of up to 98.21%. In the physical realm, we test our approach in two real-world settings: a traffic intersection and a parking lot, using a thermal infrared camera. Here, we attain an ASR of up to 98.38%. Wen Yin 0001, Jian Lou 0001, Pan Zhou 0001, Yulai Xie 0002, Dan Feng 0001, Tailai Zhang, Lichao Sun 0001 |
CVPR | 7 |
| 2022 | Backdoor Attacks on Crowd CountingabstractCrowd counting is a regression task that estimates the number of people in a scene image, which plays a vital role in a range of safety-critical applications, such as video surveillance, traffic monitoring and flow control. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of deep learning based crowd counting models to backdoor attacks, a major security threat to deep learning. A backdoor attack implants a backdoor trigger into a target model via data poisoning so as to control the model's predictions at test time. Different from image classification models on which most of existing backdoor attacks have been developed and tested, crowd counting models are regression models that output multi-dimensional density maps, thus requiring different techniques to manipulate. In this paper, we propose two novel Density Manipulation Backdoor Attacks (DMBA- and DMBA+) to attack the model to produce arbitrarily large or small density estimations. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our DMBA attacks on five classic crowd counting models and four types of datasets. We also provide an in-depth analysis of the unique challenges of backdooring crowd counting models and reveal two key elements of effective attacks: 1) full and dense triggers and 2) manipulation of the ground truth counts or density maps. Our work could help evaluate the vulnerability of crowd counting models to potential backdoor attacks. Tailai Zhang, Xingjun Ma, Pan Zhou 0001, Jian Lou 0001, Zichuan Xu, Xing Di, Yu Cheng 0001, Lichao Sun 0001 |
ACM Multimedia | 2 |