Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Hulin Yang
dblp:324/6978
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Distributed systems · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Distributed systems
consensus |
0.3 | 1 | 2026 | BriDe Arbitrager: Enhancing Arbitrage in Ethereum 2.0 via Bribery-Enabled Delayed Block Production · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026 |
Distributed systems › consensus › permissionless consensus
proof-of-stake |
0.3 | 1 | 2026 | BriDe Arbitrager: Enhancing Arbitrage in Ethereum 2.0 via Bribery-Enabled Delayed Block Production · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
transaction ordering · 2.0game-theoretic bribery strategy · 2.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | BriDe Arbitrager: Enhancing Arbitrage in Ethereum 2.0 via Bribery-Enabled Delayed Block ProductionabstractThe advent of Ethereum 2.0 has introduced significant changes, particularly the shift to Proof-of-Stake consensus. This change presents new opportunities and challenges for arbitrage. Amidst these changes, we introduce BriDe Arbitrager, a novel tool designed for Ethereum 2.0 that leveragesBribery-driven attacks toDelay block production and increase arbitrage gains. The main idea is to allow malicious proposers to delay block production by bribing validators/proposers, thereby gaining more time to identify arbitrage opportunities. Through analysing the bribery process, we design an adaptive bribery strategy. Additionally, we propose a Delayed Transaction Ordering Algorithm to leverage the delayed time to amplify arbitrage profits for malicious proposers. To ensure fairness and automate the bribery process, we design and implement a bribery smart contract and a bribery client. As a result, BriDe Arbitrager enables adversaries controlling a limited ($\lt 1/4$) fraction of the voting powers to delay block production via bribery and arbitrage more profit. Extensive experimental results based on Ethereum historical transactions demonstrate that BriDe Arbitrager yields an average of 8.78 ETH (16,687.88 USD) daily profits. Furthermore, our approach does not trigger any slashing mechanisms and remains effective even under Proposer Builder Separation and other potential mechanisms will be adopted by Ethereum. Hulin Yang, Jin Zhang 0001, Alia Asheralieva, Qingsong Wei, Rick Siow Mong Goh |
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. | 1 |