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Hulin Yang

dblp:324/6978 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Distributed systems · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Distributed systems
consensus
0.312026
BriDe Arbitrager: Enhancing Arbitrage in Ethereum 2.0 via Bribery-Enabled Delayed Block Production · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Distributed systems › consensus › permissionless consensus
proof-of-stake
0.312026
BriDe Arbitrager: Enhancing Arbitrage in Ethereum 2.0 via Bribery-Enabled Delayed Block Production · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

transaction ordering · 2.0game-theoretic bribery strategy · 2.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 BriDe Arbitrager: Enhancing Arbitrage in Ethereum 2.0 via Bribery-Enabled Delayed Block Production
abstract
The advent of Ethereum 2.0 has introduced significant changes, particularly the shift to Proof-of-Stake consensus. This change presents new opportunities and challenges for arbitrage. Amidst these changes, we introduce BriDe Arbitrager, a novel tool designed for Ethereum 2.0 that leveragesBribery-driven attacks toDelay block production and increase arbitrage gains. The main idea is to allow malicious proposers to delay block production by bribing validators/proposers, thereby gaining more time to identify arbitrage opportunities. Through analysing the bribery process, we design an adaptive bribery strategy. Additionally, we propose a Delayed Transaction Ordering Algorithm to leverage the delayed time to amplify arbitrage profits for malicious proposers. To ensure fairness and automate the bribery process, we design and implement a bribery smart contract and a bribery client. As a result, BriDe Arbitrager enables adversaries controlling a limited ($\lt 1/4$) fraction of the voting powers to delay block production via bribery and arbitrage more profit. Extensive experimental results based on Ethereum historical transactions demonstrate that BriDe Arbitrager yields an average of 8.78 ETH (16,687.88 USD) daily profits. Furthermore, our approach does not trigger any slashing mechanisms and remains effective even under Proposer Builder Separation and other potential mechanisms will be adopted by Ethereum.
Hulin Yang, Jin Zhang 0001, Alia Asheralieva, Qingsong Wei, Rick Siow Mong Goh
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.1