As AI systems are increasingly incorporated into domains where human behavior has set the norm, a challenge for AI governance and AI alignment research is to regulate their behavior in a way that is useful and constructive for society. One way to answer this question is to ask: how do we govern the human behavior that the models are emulating? To evaluate human behavior, the American legal system often uses the "Reasonable Person Standard." The idea of "reasonable" behavior comes up in nearly every area of law. The legal system often judges the actions of parties with respect to what a reasonable person would have done under similar circumstances. This paper argues that the reasonable person standard provides useful guidelines for the type of behavior we should develop, probe, and stress-test in models. It explains how reasonableness is defined and used in key areas of the law using illustrative cases, how the reasonable person standard could apply to AI behavior in each of these areas and contexts, and how our societal understanding of "reasonable" behavior provides useful technical goals for AI researchers.

Recent work has documented striking heterogeneity in the performance of state-of-the-art vision language models (VLMs), including both multimodal language models and text-to-image models. These models are able to describe and generate a diverse array of complex, naturalistic images, yet they exhibit surprising failures on basic multi-object reasoning tasks -- such as counting, localization, and simple forms of visual analogy -- that humans perform with near perfect accuracy. To better understand this puzzling pattern of successes and failures, we turn to theoretical accounts of the binding problem in cognitive science and neuroscience, a fundamental problem that arises when a shared set of representational resources must be used to represent distinct entities (e.g., to represent multiple objects in an image), necessitating the use of serial processing to avoid interference. We find that many of the puzzling failures of state-of-the-art VLMs can be explained as arising due to the binding problem, and that these failure modes are strikingly similar to the limitations exhibited by rapid, feedforward processing in the human brain.