EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jan H. Klemmer
dblp:325/3232
· DBLP profile ↗
11ranked-venue papers
4as first author
11since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-6994-7206ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 11 · 4 first-author · 11 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Attributing Open-Source Contributions is Critical but Difficult: A Systematic Analysis of GitHub Practices and Their Impact on Software Supply Chain Security
Jan-Ulrich Holtgrave, Kay Friedrich, Fabian Fischer 0009, Nicolas Huaman Groschopf, Niklas Busch, Jan H. Klemmer, Marcel Fourné, Oliver Wiese, Dominik Wermke, Sascha Fahl |
NDSS | 6 |
| 2025 | Transparency in Usable Privacy and Security Research: Scholars' Perspectives, Practices, and RecommendationsabstractTransparent reporting of research is a crucial aspect of good scientific practice and contributes to trustworthy science. Transparency helps to understand research processes, assess the validity of research contributions, and facilitates replication of studies and reported results. In the face of reproducibility crises in other fields, the security and privacy (SP) research community in general and the usable privacy and security (UPS) community in particular lack clear standards for transparent research reporting. To gain insights into current research transparency practices and associated challenges and obstacles in the UPS community, we report findings from 24 semi-structured interviews with UPS researchers. We find that researchers value research transparency and already apply several transparency reporting practices. However, an implicit community standard without incentives that outweigh challenges and drawbacks appears to prevent further advances in research transparency. Based on our findings, we conclude with recommendations for transparency practices and guidance for publication venues to better incentivize research transparency (e.g., adapting artifact evaluation to typical UPS artifacts like study materials) and to alleviate constraints that hinder transparency (e.g., removing page limits on appendices). We hope our findings can spur community discussion and effort to improve research quality through more transparent research reporting. Jan H. Klemmer, Juliane Schmüser, Byron Lowens, Fabian Fischer 0009, Lea Schmüser, Florian Schaub, Sascha Fahl |
SP | 1 |
| 2025 | How Transparent is Usable Privacy and Security Research? A Meta-Study on Current Research Transparency Practices
Jan H. Klemmer, Juliane Schmüser, Fabian Fischer 0009, Jacques Suray, Jan-Ulrich Holtgrave, Simon Lenau, Byron Lowens, Florian Schaub, Sascha Fahl |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2025 | "That's my perspective from 30 years of doing this": An Interview Study on Practices, Experiences, and Challenges of Updating Cryptographic Code
Alexander Krause 0002, Harjot Kaur, Jan H. Klemmer, Oliver Wiese, Sascha Fahl |
USENIX Security Symposium | 3 |
| 2024 | Using AI Assistants in Software Development: A Qualitative Study on Security Practices and ConcernsabstractFollowing the recent release of AI assistants, such as OpenAI's ChatGPT and GitHub Copilot, the software industry quickly utilized these tools for software development tasks, e.g., generating code or consulting AI for advice. While recent research has demonstrated that AI-generated code can contain security issues, how software professionals balance AI assistant usage and security remains unclear. This paper investigates how software professionals use AI assistants in secure software development, what security implications and considerations arise, and what impact they foresee on secure software development. We conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with software professionals, including software engineers, team leads, and security testers. We also reviewed 190 relevant Reddit posts and comments to gain insights into the current discourse surrounding AI assistants for software development. Our analysis of the interviews and Reddit posts finds that despite many security and quality concerns, participants widely use AI assistants for security-critical tasks, e.g., code generation, threat modeling, and vulnerability detection. Their overall mistrust leads to checking AI suggestions in similar ways to human code, although they expect improvements and, therefore, a heavier use for security tasks in the future. We conclude with recommendations for software professionals to critically check AI suggestions, AI creators to improve suggestion security and capabilities for ethical security tasks, and academic researchers to consider general-purpose AI in software development. Jan H. Klemmer, Stefan Horstmann, Nikhil Patnaik, Cordelia Ludden, Cordell Burton Jr., Carson Powers, Fabio Massacci, Akond Ashfaque Ur Rahman, Daniel Votipka, Heather Lipford, Awais Rashid, Alena Naiakshina, Sascha Fahl |
CCS | 1 |
| 2024 | "You have to read 50 different RFCs that contradict each other": An Interview Study on the Experiences of Implementing Cryptographic Standards
Nicolas Huaman Groschopf, Jacques Suray, Jan H. Klemmer, Marcel Fourné, Sabrina Klivan, Ivana Trummová, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl |
USENIX Security Symposium | 3 |
| 2023 | "Make Them Change it Every Week!": A Qualitative Exploration of Online Developer Advice on Usable and Secure AuthenticationabstractUsable and secure authentication on the web and beyond is mission-critical. While password-based authentication is still widespread, users have trouble dealing with potentially hundreds of online accounts and their passwords. Alternatives or extensions such as multi-factor authentication have their own challenges and find only limited adoption. Finding the right balance between security and usability is challenging for developers. Previous work found that developers use online resources to inform security decisions when writing code. Similar to other areas, lots of authentication advice for developers is available online, including blog posts, discussions on Stack Overflow, research papers, or guidelines by institutions like OWASP or NIST. Jan H. Klemmer, Marco Gutfleisch, Christian Stransky, Yasemin Acar, M. Angela Sasse, Sascha Fahl |
CCS | 1 |
| 2023 | "Always Contribute Back": A Qualitative Study on Security Challenges of the Open Source Supply ChainabstractOpen source components are ubiquitous in companies’ setups, processes, and software. Utilizing these external components as building blocks enables companies to leverage the benefits of open source software, allowing them to focus their efforts on features and faster delivery instead of writing their own components. But by introducing these components into their software stack, companies inherit unique security challenges and attack surfaces: including code from potentially unvetted contributors and obligations to assess and mitigate the impact of vulnerabilities in external components.In 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with software developers, architects, and engineers from industry projects, we investigate their projects’ processes, decisions, and considerations in the context of external open source code. We find that open source components play an important role in many of our participants’ projects, that most projects have some form of company policy or at least best practice for including external code, and that many developers wish for more developer-hours, dedicated teams, or tools to better audit included components. Based on our findings, we discuss implications for company stakeholders and the open source software ecosystem. Overall, we appeal to companies to not treat the open source ecosystem as a free (software) supply chain and instead to contribute towards the health and security of the overall software ecosystem they benefit from and are part of. Dominik Wermke, Jan H. Klemmer, Noah Wöhler, Juliane Schmüser, Harshini Sri Ramulu, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl |
SP | 2 |
| 2023 | Pushed by Accident: A Mixed-Methods Study on Strategies of Handling Secret Information in Source Code Repositories
Alexander Krause 0002, Jan H. Klemmer, Nicolas Huaman Groschopf, Dominik Wermke, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2022 | How Does Usable Security (Not) End Up in Software Products? Results From a Qualitative Interview StudyabstractFor software to be secure in practice, users need to be willing and able to appropriately use security features. These features are usually implemented by software professionals during the software development process (SDP), who may be unable to consider the usability of these mechanisms. While research has made progress in supporting developers in creating secure software products, very little attention has been paid to whether and how these security features are made usable. In a semi-structured interview study with 25 software professionals (software developers, designers, architects), we explored how they and other decision-makers encounter and deal with security and usability during the software development process in their companies. Based on 37 hours of interview recordings, we qualitatively analyzed and investigated 23 distinct development contexts in detail. In addition to individual awareness and factors that directly influence the implementation phase, we identify a high impact of contextual factors, such as stakeholder pressure, presence of expertise, and collaboration culture, and the specific implementation of the SDP on usable security in software products. We conclude our work by highlighting important gaps, such as studying and improving contextual factors that contribute to usable security and discussing potential improvements of the status quo. Marco Gutfleisch, Jan H. Klemmer, Niklas Busch, Yasemin Acar, M. Angela Sasse, Sascha Fahl |
SP | 2 |
| 2022 | Committed to Trust: A Qualitative Study on Security & Trust in Open Source Software ProjectsabstractOpen Source Software plays an important role in many software ecosystems. Whether in operating systems, network stacks, or as low-level system drivers, software we encounter daily is permeated with code contributions from open source projects. Decentralized development and open collaboration in open source projects introduce unique challenges: code submissions from unknown entities, limited personpower for commit or dependency reviews, and bringing new contributors up-to-date in projects’ best practices & processes.In 27 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with owners, maintainers, and contributors from a diverse set of open source projects, we investigate their security and trust practices. For this, we explore projects’ behind-the-scene processes, provided guidance & policies, as well as incident handling & encountered challenges. We find that our participants’ projects are highly diverse both in deployed security measures and trust processes, as well as their underlying motivations. Based on our findings, we discuss implications for the open source software ecosystem and how the research community can better support open source projects in trust and security considerations. Overall, we argue for supporting open source projects in ways that consider their individual strengths and limitations, especially in the case of smaller projects with low contributor numbers and limited access to resources. Dominik Wermke, Noah Wöhler, Jan H. Klemmer, Marcel Fourné, Yasemin Acar, Sascha Fahl |
SP | 3 |